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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUHTT
STATE OF UTAH
..—OOOOOOOOO—"-'-DAVID W. WATSON,
OBDEH
Plaintiff,
Civil MO. 924400816

vs.

Judge:
Defendant.
~
The

oooOOOooo—-——

above-entitled

natter

cane

before

the

court,

Commissioner Howard Haetani presiding, for consideration of the
Cohabitant Abuse Order and the Orders to Show Cause of each of the
parties, on Tuesday, the 2nd day of June, 1992.

The Plaintiff was

present in person represented by counsel, Marilyn Moody Brown. The
Defendant was present in person represented by counsel, David 6.
Dolofltz.

The court heard and considered the arguments of counsel,

examined the exhibits and pleadings filed by counsel on behalf of
the parties, listened to the stipulations of the parties and heard
the testimony of Barbara Bair of the Division of Family Services,
determined to accept the stipulations of the parties and being
advised in the premises as to the matters in issue, makes the

following recommendations which pursuant to the provisions of Rule
6-401 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration are entered as
the Order of this court.
XV Ifi HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED thatt
1.

Bach of the parties is enjoined and prohibited from

physically or verbally harassing, abusing* injuring, or annoying
the other party or the minor children of the parties at any time or
at any place during the pendency of this natter.

Bach of the

parties is enjoined and prohibited from going on or about the
premises of the other.

The Protective Order previously Issued by

the court is continued In full force and effect for its statutory
duration except as nodifled herein.
2.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant are each enjoined

and prohibited from making any negative or derogatory comments
about the other party to the minor children of the parties at any
time or place.
3.

Temporary care, custody and control of McCade, the

minor child of the parties and Lindsay and Soott, the minor
children of the Plaintiff from a prior marriage, is awarded to the
Defendant as Barbara Balr, a social worker from the Division of
Family Services on behalf of that agency, has spoken with the minor
children of the parties and determined that Scott has advised her
that his

father,

the Plaintiff, tried to choke him on three

occasions and he is afraid of him? that Lindsay has advised her
that her father, the Plaintiff, choked her on at least one occasion
and she is afraid of him; that both of the children stated that

2

their

father,

the

Plaintiff,

takes

actions

which

make

them

emotionally afraid of bin and they are afraid to go with him.

The

Plaintiff maintained that these ideas come from the Defendant*
4,

The Division of Family Services

is ordered to

continue the investigation of child abuse which it commenced on
April 21, 1992 after the cohabitant Abuse Order was issued in this
matter and to finish their evaluation and analyses as to whether or
not either the Plaintiff or the Defendant has abused children.
Division

of

Family

Services

is

further

ordered

to

The

monitor

visitation of the Plaintiff with the children and help coordinate
arranging a supervised visit between the children and the Plaintiff
through Shirley Reynolds, then to report back to the court so the
court can determine what further orders are appropriate in regard
to visitation;

for example,

should

the

court

adopt

standard

visitation or limit visitation in some fashion and assist the court
in a determination as to whether or not a guardian ad litem should
be appointed for the children.
5.

Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited from

taking any action to secrete, dissipate, encumber or take any
action that may Impair or decrease the value of the real or
pereonal property of the parties during the pendency of this action
specifically including the art work which is in the home, provided,
however, the Defendant having been permitted to run the business of
the Flying NN* Stables, is permitted to sell assets such as hay,
livestock and horses in the operation of that business but she must
account

to

the

Plaintiff

and

ultimately

3

the

court,

for her

operation of that business.
6*

The parties, through their counsel, shall Inventory

the art collection which ie maintained in the home the uae of which
the court is awarding to the Plaintiff, as soon as possible.

The

art shall remain in its present location.
7.

The Defendant shall have the use and possession of

the home at 11075 Loafer Canyon Road, Salem, Utah.

The Plaintiff

is enjoined and prohibited from coming on or about that property.
The property is to be listed for sale and, if possible, the parties
are to sell that home.
8.

The Plaintiff is awarded use and possession of the

1982 Suburban and the 1985 Toyota Supra.

The Defendant is awarded

the use and possession of the 1986 Toyota Forerunner and the 1990
Chevrolet Pickup Truck.
9.

The Plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health,

life, dental, homeowners and automobile insurance for the parties
during the pendency of this action.

Each of the parties shall pay

one-half of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontic, counseling
or eye care expenses incurred for and on behalf of the minor
children,
10.

The Defendant shall remove from the home of the

parties and provide to the Plaintiff the Plaintiff's personal
effects and those items of property which she agrees are his and
should be awarded to him.
11.
the Plying

The Defendant shall operate the business known as

m

iam Stables subject to accounting for its profit or
4

loss.

In sixty (60) days counsel for the parties* should the

Plaintiff so desire,

shall

contact the court and review the

situation in regard to the business operation of the Flying "IP
Stables and whether it should continue to operate, be shut down,
sold or any other action taken other than permitting the Defendant
to operate it.
12.

The RV and boat shall be sold.

The net proceeds of

sale shall be used to pay debts of the parties as they agree*

If

they do not agree, these funds snail be hold in escrow pending
further order of the court.
13.

The parties are each ordered to consult a therapist

and counsel with their therapist and working with the custody
evaluator, jointly choose a therapist for the children.
14.

Dr. Elizabeth Stewart is appointed as the custody

evaluator by the court to perform a custody evaluation in this
matter.

The Plaintiff shall pay for the services of Dr, Stewart.

Dr. Stewart when she completes her report shall file the original
with the court and provide copies to counsel for eaoh of the
parties, provided, however, said coolqa ar* confidential and a*«
not to be shown to anv patrson gp party, but are made available to
counsel solely for their convenience in advising their clients in
this matter.

Should this action go to trial, counsel for the

parties shall consult with Dr. Stewart and determine what portions,
if any, of the report may be shown to the clients as preparation
for and the conducting of trial. With Dr. Stewart' a permission, in
the event of trial, the reports may be shown to the clients as she

5

has advised counsel.
15.

The

Plaintiff

Dollars in life insurance.
and effect.

has

one

million

($1,000,000,00)

He shall continue that in full force

Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000*00) Dollars of that

insurance shell be designated to the Defendant as beneficiary in
the

event of the Plaintiff's

death.

The

children shall be

designated as beneficiaries of the remaining S^vt^n Hundred Thousand
($700,000*00) Dollars in the following portions:
Travis;

$200,000.00

for

Lindsay;

$200,000.00

$100,000.00 for
for

HcCade;

$200,000. 00 for 8cott.
16.

The parties own a condominium on the island of Maui.

That condominium shall be listed for sale and sold.

The net

proceeds of sale shall be utilised to pay debts of the parties as
they mutually agree. In the absence of agreement, the net proceeds
of 8ale shall be placed in escrow and held until further order of
the court.
17.
The

Plaintiff

condominium.

The parties own a condominium in St. George, Utah.
shall

continue

making

the

payments

on

that

The parties shall share the rights to use the

condominium with the Defendant having the right to make first
choice and fourth choice as to which two weeks of the year she
shall use.

The remainder shall be awarded to the Plaintiff.
18.

The court has determined that the Plaintiff had a

gross monthly Income during 1992 of $35,600.00 per month.
withholding of taxes he has a net income of $24,444,60.

After
The

Plaintiff filed with the oourt a debt schedule which included

6

making the house payments and many of those debts which the
Defendant had included in her request for support*

The monthly

payments on that schedule total $15/866. 29.
19.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay the marital debts as

he listed them on the exhibit given to the court, a copy of which
is

attached

hereto.

They total

$15,866.29 per month*

The

Plaintiff is ordered to make those payments and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom*

As debts will be paid, the disposal net income

of the Plaintiff will increase*

Accordingly, the Defendant is

free/ after payment of some of these debts, to request the oourt to
re-examine the support ordors hereinafter entered.
20.

In setting child support, the oourt finds that the

Plaintiff has a gross income of $35,600.00 per month.

Based

thereon child support is set in the sum of $3, 900* 00 per month for
the three

(3) children,

McCade,

Scott

and Lindsay.

As the

Plaintiff has included insurance in his list of expenses, no
additional credit is given to him against the award for this
purpose.
21.

The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff

alimony in the sum of $800.00 per month provided, however/ the
Defendant is free to return to court to seek additional alimony
when the debts of the parties have been paid down sufficiently so
that the Plaintiff will have additional disposable income or should
she determine, as a result of discovery, that the Plaintiff has
income above and beyond that which was presented to the court in
the exhibits presented to the court, copies of which are attached

7

hereto.
22.

The Plaintiff has requested possession of certain

business /partnership, family records which are in the home of the
parties.

The Defendant has agreed to supply them,

opportunity to copy them before transmitting.

but requested an
They are to be

copied and transmitted within the next ten (10) days.
23.

The

Defendant

requested

the

court

for

support

retroactive to May 1, 1992, based on requesting the hearing In this
matter initially on Nay 12/ 1992 and continuing it until June 2,
1992.

The Court has determined that some payment was made on

behalf of the Defendant during May and therefore directs that the
Plaintiff pay one-half of the ordered child support, that is,
$400.oo in alimony and $1,950. 00 as child support for the month of
May, which the Plaintiff said he would pay immediately.

This

should be paid on or before June 5, 1992.
24.

Child support and alimony payment* ordered by this

court shall be paid one-half on the Sth day of each month, and onehalf on the 20th day of each month*

Accordingly, the Plaintiff

shall pay $400. 00 as alimony to the Plaintiff on the Sth of each
month and $400.00 as alimony on the 20th of each month and
$1,950.00 as child support on the Sth day of eaoh month and
$1,950.00 on the 20th of each month, commencing on the 5th day of
June, 1992.
25.

The Defendant' s request for attorney' e fees and suit

money is reserved,

at this point, for further ruling when the

financial status of the parties is more clear.

8

26.

She Plaintiff clalned that the Defendant had in her

possession a pager.

The Defendant stated that this had been

returned to the Plaintiff.

The pager is to be returned to the

Plaintiff, if it has not been so returned.

If the Defendant

discovers another pager, or the pager in question,

she shall

forthwith have it delivered to the Plaintiff.
DATED this

K

day of S ^ f r * ^ - ^

1992.

BT THE COURT:

SIONER JfOWARD H. MASTANX
APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND CONTENT:

MARILYN MOODY BROWN, Counsel
for Plaintiff

"LW^^X
<y
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ,

Cow

for Defendant
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I hereby oertlfy that I caused to be nailed this _if_Tday
of June, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to
the following individualx
Marilyn Moody Brown
ROBINSON, 5EILS&, GLAZIER « BRON»
80 North 100 Baat
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266

(ab\dad\W*tman. OrtferJ
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I T - nisf RiCT COURT
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93K0VI6 AMU* 18

ORIGINAL
C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
Utah Bar #5455
P.O. Box 243
405 East State Road
American Fork, Utah, 84003
(801) 756-0554

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
DAVID WARREN WATSON,

]
•
]>

Plaintiff,
vs.

i

SUZANNE WATSON,

]
)
]

Defendant.

PROTECTIVE ORDER WITH
OTHER TEMPORARY ORDERS
Civil No. 924400816
Commissioner Howard Maetani

THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the Honorable
Judge Steven Hansen on October 28, 1993, for hearing on the issue
of a protective order in Case Number 934401861 and upon Defendant's
order to Show Cause in this action, the parties appearing in person
and with their respective attorneys of record, the parties having
stipulated as to some issues, the parties having reserved some
issues and the Court having ruled as to other issues, the Court
having reviewed the files and records herein, the pleadings in the
two (2) 1993 cases and in this matter, and deeming itself fully
advised, finds the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties have agreed that the order of this Court

signed June 8, 1992, in this case (Case Number 924400816) remains
in full force and effect until modified by the Court,
support and alimony under the June 8, 1992, order

Child

shall be

effective with the month of August 1993, with no assessment of
arrearage prior to August 1993.
2.

The parties have agreed that Plaintiff shall pay full

child support and alimony from this time forward without deduction
for any claimed off sets.
3.

The parties have informed the Court that there is a

dispute as to child support and alimony arrearage from August 1993
to present due to some off sets claimed by Plaintiff against child
support and alimony. The parties have agreed that Plaintiff shall
pay $500 toward the claimed arrearage within the next five (5) days
and that any remaining issue regarding arrearage will be resolved
at the next scheduled hearing on November 16, 1993.
4.

The parties have informed the Court that Defendant

presently has custody of the parties minor child and Plaintiff's
children from a prior marriage.

Plaintiff has informed the Court

that he desires that his children from a prior marriage be placed
in the custody of his sister and her family in Nevada.

Defendant

has informed the Court that the children and Doctor Gail Stringham
recommend

against

this

until

a

full

custody

evaluation

is

completed. The parties have agreed that Doctor Elizabeth Stewart of
Salt Lake City, Utah, shall be appointed as a custody evaluator and

that Plaintiff shall arrange for payment of her costs and fees. As
to Plaintiff's children by a former marriage, the parties have
agreed that Plaintiff's sister and her family may be involved as
part of the evaluation to determine if such placement is in the
children's best interest of these children.
5.

Plaintiff has stipulated that a protective order may

enter against him in favor of Defendant, but has requested that any
protective order be mutual.

Defendant has objected to a mutual

protective order and the parties have agreed to leave resolution of
this issue to the court.
6.

The parties have agreed that Defendant will process an

insurance claim for the death of one (1) of the horses as soon as
possible and that when the funds are received which are expected to
be approximately $50,000, the funds will be placed in the trust
account of C. ROBERT COLLINS until further order of the Court or
agreement of the parties.
7.

The parties have agreed that there is approximately

$30,000 due from the Internal Revenue Service for the 1992 tax
return and that these funds should be received within the next four
(4) to six (6) weeks. When these funds are received, they will be
placed in the trust account of SAMUEL McVEY. From these funds, Mr.
McVey shall pay to himself on behalf of Plaintiff the sum of
$5000.00 for attorney's fees.

Mr. McVey shall also pay to C.

ROBERT COLLINS on behalf of Defendant the sum of $5,000 for

attorney's fees.

The balance of these funds shall be held in Mr.

McVey's trust account until further order of the Court or agreement
of the parties.
8.

The parties have agreed that 32 acres of range property

may be sold by Defendant upon receipt of an acceptable offer
approved by both parties and that these funds shall be placed in
the trust account of one (1) of the attorneys until agreement of
the parties or further order of the Court.
9.

The parties have agreed that all personal items belonging

to one party, but in the possession of the other such as clothes,
fashion accessories, etc., shall be turned over to the party to
whom it belongs thought counsel.
10.

The parties have agreed that any and all other issues

between the parties may be considered by the Court at the November
16, 1993, hearing before Commissioner Howard Maetani.
10.

The Court has determined that the protective order should

be mutual due to allegations of aggression against both parties.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:
A.

The order of this Court signed June 8, 1992, in Case

Number 924400816 shall be and is hereby determined to be in full
force and effect until modified by the Court.
B.

Child support and alimony under the June 8, 1993, order

shall be effective August 1993, with no assessment of arrearage
prior to August 1993.

C.

Plaintiff shall pay all future child support and alimony

without deduction for off sets he may claim. Whether or not either
party is entitled to off sets shall be reserved for further order
of the Court.
D.

Plaintiff

shall pay

$500 toward

the

child

support

arrearage claimed by Defendant within the next five (5) days. The
remaining arrearage claim shall be reserved for resolution at the
next scheduled hearing on November 16, 1993.
E.

Doctor Elizabeth Stewart of Salt Lake City, Utah, shall

be and is hereby appoint as a custody evaluator.

Plaintiff shall

arrange for payment of her costs and fees. Plaintiff's sister and
her family may be involved as part of the evaluation to determine
whether or not Plaintiff's children by a prior marriage should be
placed in her custody.
F.

Defendant shall process the insurance claim for the death

of one (1) of the horses as soon as possible and when the funds are
received, those funds shall be placed in the trust account of C.
ROBERT COLLINS until further order of the Court or agreement of the
parties.
G.

The refund from the Internal Revenue Service for the 1992

tax return shall be placed in the trust account of SAMUEL McVEY.
From these funds, Mr. McVey shall pay to himself on behalf of
Plaintiff the sum of $5000.00 for attorney's fees. Mr. McVey shall
also pay from these funds to C. ROBERT COLLINS on behalf of

Defendant the sum of $5,000 for attorney's fees.

The balance of

these funds shall be held in Mr. McVey's trust account until
further order of the Court or agreement of the parties.
H.

The 32 acres of range property may be sold by Defendant

upon receipt of an acceptable offer approved by both parties and
the funds received from this sale shall be placed in the trust
account of one (1) of the attorneys until agreement of the parties
or further order of the Court.
I.

Any other issues between the parties may be considered by

the Court on November 16, 1993 at the order to show cause hearing
scheduled before Commissioner Howard Maetani.
J.

There shall be mutual protective orders entered between

the parties.
K.

All personal items belonging to one party, but in the

possession of the other such as clothes, fashion accessories, etc.,
shall be turned over to the party to whom it belongs thought
counsel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither of the parties shall cause,
attempt to cause, or threaten physical harm to the other at any
time or place.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall stay away from
resident or dwelling place of the other and the others place of
employment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,

the protective order provision herein shall be effective for a
period of 120 days from the date hereon.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further service of this order on
either parties needs to be made since both parties were present in
court when this order was issued by the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the protective order in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff shall also apply to the minor child
of the parties, Defendant's minor child and the minor children of
Plaintiff in Defendant's custody / ^^f^t^ftf^

O^^^e

*3U^

^ ^ ^ ^

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall be and are
hereby

restrained

from

engaging

in molesting,

threatening,

harassing or annoying behavior toward the other in any matter
during the pendency of this action.
NOTICE:

Violation of the protective orders set forth herein

may result in immediate arrest and in criminal charges being
brought against the party violating,? these orders.
Dated and signed this

day of November/ 1993.'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was sent by facsimile transmission and mailed, postage
prepaid on the 28th day of October, 1993, to Plaintiff's Attorney
and again with agreed upon corrections of the 3rd day of November,
1993, at:
SAMUEL D. MCVEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111

C- ROBERT COLLINS

Tab 3

F O U R T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
U T A H COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH

RLE)

125 North 100 West
P.O. Box 1847
Provo, UT 84603

DATE: July 18, 1994

^

v

'

The Fourth Judicial District Court is rerumiiiH to you the enclosed document(s) for
the following reasons:

Judge Harding did not sign the Order to Show Cause as he wishes to deal with the
property and alimony issues when the other issues are resolved in Juvenile Court. Judge
Hansen didn't sign the documents as this matter is no longer before him.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact this office at
(801) 429-1039.

Carma B. Smith
Clerk of the Court

Deputy Clerk

11

Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704)
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

vs.

:

SUZANNE WATSON,

:

Defendant.

:

MOTION FOR ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
Civil No. 924400816
Judge Raymond M. Harding

Plaintiff David W. Watson, by and through his counsel of record, hereby moves
this Court for an order requiring defendant Suzanne Watson to appear before the
above-entitled Court at the Fourth Judicial District Courthouse, 125 North 100 West,
Provo, Utah, Room 201, on the 14th day of July, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., then
and there to show cause, if any she may have, why the following relief should not be
granted:

(1)

Why plaintiffs temporary alimony obligation should not be eliminated in

light of the fact that plaintiff is unemployed and has thus far been unable to find even
temporary employment.
(2)

Why unnecessary and unutilized assets of the marital estate should not be

liquidated with the proceeds applied to paying off the enormous debt load of the
marital estate.
(3)

Why plaintiff should not be solely authorized to sell said assets provided

all sale proceeds be placed in trust pending final resolution of this matter.
(4)

Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for failing to

provide a complete accounting to the court and to the independent certified public
accountant for the business known as Rying "N" Stables and all other business she has
transacted in relation to the parties' horse ranch and related facilities.
(5)

Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for the sale of

the parties' horses in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 1992 which
permitted only the disposal of the horse business assets such as hay, etc. and further
why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for failing to account for the
sale of the parties' horses as required by Orders of the Court dated June 8, 1992 and
January 10, 1994.

-2-

(6)

Why defendant should not be required to place all proceeds from the sale

of all horses owned by the parties in trust pending final determination of this matter.
(7)

Why the business Flying "N" Stables together with the Payson ranch, barn

and ranch house should not be sold due to the fact the horse business is losing money
and causing a financial drain on the marital estate.
(8)

Why Plaintiff should not be granted access to the ranch house and

property in order to remove his personal property from those premises.
(9)

Why the monthly rental from the ranch house, which amount is currently

being received by defendant, should not be applied in its entirety to the mortgage on
such ranch house, particularly now that Plaintiff is unemployed and will not be able to
continue to make monthly payments.
(10)

Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for secreting

money and not providing an accounting of funds in the amount of $28,000 and in the
amount of $9,000 from sales of horses and cattle in violation of the Order of the Court
dated June 8, 1992 and the December 7, 1993 Order.
(11)

Why defendant should not be restrained from entering the Loafer Canyon

Property unless in the presence of the realtor due to the fact that it appears defendant
has removed materials left at the property which materials, such as Plaintiffs vacuum
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cleaner, ladder, etc, were left at the house to facilitate the final cleaning, painting and
repair of the property for its sale.
(12)

Why another listing agent should not be appointed to handle the real

properties which the parties are attempting to sell when the current listing contract
expires in light of the fact that the present listing agent has had no success in the past
nine months,
(13)

Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for removing art

from the Loafer Canyon house in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8,
1992.
(14)

Why defendant should not return the following personal items which

defendant removed from the Loafer Canyon property:
a.

Art of family partnership, namely the Behren's "Parasol11.

b.

All Judy Larsen Art, which is owned by Watson-Kendall
Investment Co.

c*

Plaintiffs wedding rings.

d.

Doug Ault lithographs, Andy Worhal, and Marilyn Monroe
lithographies.

e.

Plaintiffs tennis racquet.

f.

Plaintiffs Compact Discs left in the home.
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An electrical muscle stimulator belonging to Matt Carlson.
Plaintiffs perfect swing trainer video.
Plaintiffs black Trek mountain bike.
Plaintiffs Minolta Camera and carrying case and two lenses.
The Packard Bell 486 computer, printer, and keyboard which are
owned by the corporation.
Plaintiffs Mita copier.
Tools which belonged to plaintiffs father and tools which were
owned by plaintiff at the time of the marriage.
Art of Pardell, Dolitte, Toulose Lautrac, Monet and Pizarro's
"Street Vendor."
5 personal grooming sets located in the Study of the parties' home.
The second unassembled barbecue grill which was located in the
metal building.
Personal photograph albums belonging to Plaintiff and to his first
wife, Hillary.
Plates, utensils, pots and pans from recreational vehicle that sold
and that were in boxes in the metal building.
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(15)

Why defendant should not be enjoined from making derogatory remarks

regarding plaintiff and from discussing or making mention of the divorce or the parties'
assets or finances with plaintiffs children or the parties' children.
(16)

Why defendant should not be obligated to pay for therapy expenses you

unilaterally incurred for herself and the children in violation of the June 8, 1992 Order.
(17)

Why defendant should not be ordered to obtain plaintiffs consent prior

to incurring expenses for which plaintiff will be obligated under prior court orders.
(18)

Why the Court's Order based upon this Order to Show Cause should not

expressly modify and supersede previous court orders.
DATED this < ^

day of June, 1994.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Daniel V. Goodsell
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2IZ- day of June, 1994, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was mailed by United
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
C. Robert Collins
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 243
405 East State Road
American Fork, UT 84003

A u f c L Auu
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704)
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID WARREN WATSON,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 924400816

SUZANNE WATSON,

Judge Raymond M. Harding

Defendant.

TO DEFENDANT AND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD:
You are hereby ordered to appear before the above-entitled Court at the Fourth
Judicial District Courthouse, 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, Room 201, on the 14th
day of July, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., then and there to show cause, if any you
may have, why the following relief should not be granted:

(1)

Why plaintiffs temporary alimony obligation should not be eliminated in

light of the fact that plaintiff is unemployed and has thus far been unable to find even
temporary employment.
(2)

Why unnecessary and unutilized assets of the marital estate should not be

liquidated with the proceeds applied to paying off the enormous debt load of the
marital estate.
(3)

Why plaintiff should not be solely authorized to sell said assets provided

that all sale proceeds be placed in trust pending final resolution of this matter.
(4)

Why you should not be held in contempt of court for failing to provide a

complete accounting to the court and to the independent certified public accountant for
the business known as Flying ,fNff Stables and all other business you have transacted in
relation to the parties' horse ranch and related facilities.
(5)

Why you should not be held in contempt of court for the sale of the

parties' horses in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 1992 which
permitted only the disposal of the horse business assets such as hay, etc. and further
why you should not be held in contempt of court for failing to account for the sale of
the parties' horses as required by Orders of the Court dated June 8, 1992 and January
10, 1994.
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Why all proceeds from the sale of all horses owned by the parties should

not be placed in trust pending final determination of this matter.
(7)

Why the business Flying "N" Stables together with the Payson ranch, barn

and ranch house should not be sold due to the fact the horse business is losing money
and causing a financial drain on the marital estate.
(8)

Why Plaintiff should not be granted access to the ranch house and

property in order to remove his personal property from those premises.
(9)

Why the monthly rental from the ranch house, which amount is currently

being received by you, should not be applied in its entirety to the mortgage on such
ranch house, particularly now that Plaintiff is unemployed and will not be able to
continue to make monthly payments.
(10)

Why you should not be held in contempt of court for secreting money

and not providing an accounting of funds in the amount of $28,000 and in the amount
of $9,000 from sales of horses and cattle in violation of the Order of the Court dated
June 8, 1992 and the December 7, 1993 Order.
(11)

Why you should not be restrained from entering the Loafer Canyon

Property unless in the presence of the realtor due to the fact that it appears you have
removed equipment and materials left at the property which materials, such as
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Plaintiffs vacuum cleaner, ladder, etc. were left at the house to facilitate the final
cleaning, painting and repair of the property for its sale.
(12)

Why another listing agent should not be appointed to handle the real

properties which the parties are attempting to sell when the current listing contract
expires in light of the fact that the present listing agent has had no success in the past
nine months.
(13)

Why you should not be held in contempt of court for removing art from

the Loafer Canyon house in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 1992.
(14)

Why you should not return the following personal items which you

removed from the Loafer Canyon property:
a.

Art of family partnership, namely the Behren's "Parasol".

b.

All Judy Larsen Art, which is owned by Watson-Kendall
Investment Co.

c.

Plaintiffs wedding rings.

d.

Doug Ault lithographs, Andy Worhal, and Marilyn Monroe
lithographies.

e.

Plaintiffs tennis racquet.

f.

Plaintiffs Compact Discs left in the home.

g.

An electrical muscle stimulator belonging to Matt Carlson.

.4.

Plaintiffs perfect swing trainer video.
Plaintiffs black Trek mountain bike.
Plaintiffs Minolta Camera and carrying case and two lenses.
The Packard Bell 486 computer, printer, and keyboard which are
owned by the corporation.
Plaintiffs Mita copier.
Tools which belonged to plaintiffs father and tools which were
owned by plaintiff at the time of the marriage.
Art of Pardell, Dolitte, Toulose Lautrac, Monet and Pizarro's
"Street Vendor."
5 personal grooming sets located in the Study of the parties' home.
The second unassembled barbecue grill which was located in the
metal building.
Personal photograph albums belonging to Plaintiff and to his first
wife, Hillaiy.
Plates, utensils, pots and pans from recreational vehicle that sold
and that were in boxes in the metal building.
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(15)

Why you should not be enjoined from making derogatory remarks

regarding plaintiff and from discussing or making mention of the divorce or the parties'
assets or finances with plaintiffs children or the parties' children.
(16)

Why you should not be obligated to pay for therapy expenses you

unilaterally incurred for yourself and the children in violation of the June 8, 1992
Order.
(17)

Why you should not be ordered to obtain plaintiffs consent prior to

incurring expenses for which plaintiff will be obligated under prior court orders.
(18)

Why the Court's Order based upon this Order to Show Cause should not

expressly modify and supersede previous court orders.
DATED this

day of June, 1994.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIHCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2Z> day of June, 1994, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was mailed by United States mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
C. Robert Collins
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 243
405 East State Road
American Fork, UT 84003

J:\SlCr\5OM\WATJONV0SC4
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704)
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID
WARREN WATSON IN
SUPPORT OF ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
SUZANNE WATSON,

Civil No. 924400816
Defendant.
Judge Raymond M. Harding

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

David W. Watson, being first duly sworn, hereby states as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in this divorce action.

2.

This affidavit is submitted in support of plaintiffs order to show cause

filed concurrently.
3.

I will not be able to return to work at Mountain View Hospital. It is

clear that the hospital is concerned that all of the personal problems engendered by
this divorce will interfere with my work. The hospital issued an invitation to the then
current anesthesiologists to submit a bid contracting their services and the services of
six Certified Registered Nurse Anesthesiologists ("CRNAs"). The CRNAs whom I have
been working with declined to join me in a bid due to all of the problems and publicity
that this extended divorce has caused. On the short notice given, it was impossible to
contact CRNAs in other areas or states, get a commitment from them that they would
be available and would agree to move to this area in time for me to present a bid to
the hospital.
4.

I have now been unemployed for over three months. I have been actively

searching for new employment, both temporary and permanent. I have looked for
work in Utah, Idaho, Nevada and Colorado. I have also placed an ad in the Journal
of American Society of Anesthesiologists. This is a particularly difficult time of the
year to find employment as an anesthesiologist since those in training who will graduate
this July have by this time taken all the available positions. While I still maintain hope
that I can find employment, I am concerned that my chances of being employed are

-2-

limited by the fact that I will have to ask for an extended leave for trial in this matter
if we cannot resolve some of these issues ahead of time.
5.

I have been depleting my accounts receivable in order to preserve as

many of the marital assets as possible. Depletion of the reserve account will also make
it more difficult for me to find employment because I will not have the funds to pay
the CRNAs salaries until the amounts for services rendered are collected. However, I
have no choice if I am to preserve as many marital assets as possible. Immediate
resolution of the property matters would increase the possibility for finding gainful
employment.
6.

Obviously, I am unable to service all of the debt load since I am

unemployed. I have attempted to arrange the sale of some of the property such as the
six-horse trailer. My attorney provided to defendant's attorney the name of the dealer
interested in purchasing the trailer, the amount he was willing to pay and the telephone
number where he could be reached. It is my understanding that defendant rejected the
offer outright. The trailer is no longer needed for a horse business that is depleted of
its horses.
7.

Working with the realtors I helped arrange the sale of the hayfield in

Lakeshore. The sale price was discounted $4,000 because defendant stated she had
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sold the hay for this year, I now believe that defendant kept the hay for her personal
use.
8.

Flying N Stables has always lost money which fact was validated by Sid

Gilbert, the independent CPA, in his report, therefore, all assets of Flying N should be
sold immediately and all funds should be placed in trust. It is apparent that defendant
has taken and/or disposed of assets such as horses and the corral structure without
accounting for any of it. If the court does not order the immediate liquidation of
Flying N and all assets associated with it, then I believe the court should appoint
someone to manage the property who will provide an accounting of all funds.
9.

Just a few days ago, someone entered the home in Loafer Canyon and

removed a vacuum cleaner, ladder, battery to my mobile phone and various other
cleaning items from the home. Defendant is the only person, other than the realtors,
who has the combination and I believe that she simply removed those items to make it
more difficult for me to ready the home for sale.
10.

Defendant has been asked repeatedly to return the personal and

corporate items taken from the home and she refuses to do so. My older childrens*
birth certificates, my wedding rings, etc. can be of no possible interest to her; I think
she simply does not want to make any effort to be reasonable. Defendant also
continues to hold my father's tools and the tools I had accumulated over the years.
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11.

I have also been prohibited from retrieving my personal property from

the Payson ranch house- I believe that removal of my personal property would make
the properties more saleable.
12.

Because I am unemployed, I believe it is imperative that the rental

income from the Payson ranch house be applied to the mortgage on that property. I
am not able to service all of the debt and a continued delay may result in my having
to file bankruptcy to prevent foreclosure on a marital asset.
DATED this 23i_ day of June, 1994.

DAVID W. WATSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^fX

affidosc
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day of June, 1994.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T hereby certify that on this < S ^ day of June, 1994, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID WARREN WATSON IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:
C Robert Collins
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 243
405 East State Road
American Fork, UT 84003

aflkLosc
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Marilyn M.Branch
Clerk of the Court

Davis W. Watsonr

ORDER

Petitioner,
Case No. 940467-CA
v*
The Honorable Ray M« Harding,
District Court Judge,
Respondent.

Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Jackson (Law & Motion).
This matter is before the court on petition for
extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 19, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.
Dated this

* ^ > day of September, 1994.

Billings, «3w3ge
dith M.. Billings,

d s > - ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^&*&

Nonaan H. J^crJcson, Judge
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C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
Utah Bar #5455
13444 North 32nd Street, #19
P.O. Box 54516
Phoenix, AZ. , 85078-4516
(602)
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
BIFUCATED DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 924400816

SUZANNE WATSON,

Judge Ray Harding

Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned on
the day written below, the parties appearing in person with their
respective attorneys of record, the Court having reviewed the files
and records herein, having made its FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and deeming itself fully advised in the premises,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant is hereby granted
a divorce from Plaintiff and the parties shall no longer be husband
and wife.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be restored to her
former of NEBEKER.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues of this litigation
shall be reserved for resolution at the time of trial.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decree should entered forthwith

-f

f\f**%

and become final upon filing^with the Clerk of the Court,
Dated this

y/+*

^^T^^^-^

/99C

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the undersigned mailed,
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the forgoing on the
of December, 1994, to:

* # %

SAMUEL D. McVEY
DANIEL V. GOODSELL
Attorneys at Law
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111
Jini L. Roby
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
32 West Center, Suite 205
Provo, Utah, 84601

C. ROBERT COLLINS
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Deputy

Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT,
ALIMONY, DIVISION OF
PROPERTY AND DIVISION OF
DEBTS

SUZANNE WATSON,
Civil No. 924400816
Defendant.
Judge Ray M. Harding
The issues of child support, alimony, division of property and division of debts in
the above-referenced matter having come on regularly for hearing on April 11-12, 1995,
the issues of child custody having been decided previously by a Juvenile Court Order
dated November 10, 1994 and this Court having previously entered a Bifurcated Decree
of Divorce on January 4, 1995, and the Court having heard testimony from the parties
and their respective witnesses and having received into evidence numerous exhibits, and
the Court having reviewed the pleadings, orders and other documents in the Court's

file on this case, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
1.

The parties were bona fide and actual residents of Utah County, State of

Utah, for a period in excess of three months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

The parties were husband and wife having married on September 2, 1988

in Utah County, State of Utah and having been divorced by a Bifurcated Decree of
Divorce dated January 4, 1995.
3.

The Court finds that the parties resided together as husband and wife for

three and one-half years until approximately April 15, 1992 when plaintiff commenced
this action for divorce.
4.

The Court further finds that the parties remained separated until July of

1992 at which time the parties attempted to reconcile. The parties attempts at
reconciliation lasted until August 27, 1993 when the parties separated for the second
and final time.
Procedural History
5.

Based upon a review of the Court's file, the Court finds that on June 8,

1992, Commissioner Howard Maetani issued a temporary order in this case providing,
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among other things, that, (1) the parties were "enjoined and prohibited from taking any
action to secrete, dissipate, encumber or take any action that may impair or decrease
the value of the real or personal property of the parties during the pendency of this
action," (2) defendant was awarded temporary use of the home at Loafer Canyon in
Salem, Utah, (3) defendant was allowed to operate the business known as the Flying
"N" Stables "subject to accounting for its profit or loss," (4) the art collection was to
remain at the Loafer Canyon house, (5) the parties were to consult a therapist and
counsel with their therapist and with the custody evaluator in jointly choosing a
therapist for the children, (6) plaintiff was awarded temporary custody of the one child
born of this marriage, McCade Watson ("McCade"), and of the two children from
defendant's previous marriage, Lindsay Watson ("Lindsay") and Scott Watson ("Scott"),
(7) based upon the finding that plaintiff had gross income at that time of $35,600.00
per month, plaintiff was ordered to pay temporary child support in the sum of
$3,900.00 per month, (8) plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant temporary alimony in
the sum of $800.00 per month, (9) plaintiff was ordered to service the marital debts
which were collectively found to require monthly payments of $15,866.29.
6.

Following the parties' second separation, the parties agreed that

Commissioner Maetani's order dated June 8, 1992 would remain in full force and
effect.
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7.

Based upon a review of the Court's file, the Court finds that the issue of

child custody was transferred to the Juvenile Court by order of Judge Steven Hansen
dated April 11, 1994 and that on November 10, 1994, Juvenile Court Judge Leslie D.
Brown, based upon the stipulation of the parties, awarded the custody of McCade and
Lindsay to defendant. Under this same stipulated order, Scott was placed in the
custody of the State of Utah.
Income of Plaintiff
8.

The Court finds that plaintiff is currently unemployed and that he is not

generating any income. The Court does find, however, that plaintiff is actively engaged
in attempting to rebuild a medical practice in the State of Nevada. Based upon the
testimony of the parties and upon plaintiffs Exhibit No. 6 which is a detailed
description of plaintiffs attempts to become employed, and following the analysis
required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App.
1994) and Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the Court finds that plaintiff
is not voluntary unemployed or underemployed. In particular, the Court finds that
plaintiff lost his employment as an anesthesiologist at Mountain View Hospital in
Payson, Utah, on or about April 1, 1994, when for reasons beyond plaintiff's control,
the hospital asked plaintiff to take a temporary leave of absence while authorities
investigated certain criminal allegations against plaintiff. The Court recognizes that an
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anesthesiologist must not be suffering from any mental or emotional impairment due to
the life or death consequences of the decisions he must make. Based upon plaintiffs
undisputed testimony regarding the allegations made against him by defendant that
plaintiff had (1) killed one of the parties' horses, (2) killed the parties' puppies, (3)
possessed certain medications illegally, (4) filed fraudulent tax returns, (5) attempted to
kill the defendant, and (6) physically and sexually abused the children, and based
further on the understandable effect such allegations would have on plaintiff's
emotional and mental state, the Court finds it was reasonable and prudent for plaintiff
to consent to take a leave of absence from the hospital upon request while the
authorities investigated the criminal allegations. The Court also finds that no criminal
charges have been filed against plaintiff with respect to such allegations and therefore
presumes that the authorities did not substantiate the criminal allegations.
9.

The Court further finds that during plaintiffs leave of absence, the

hospital decided to enter into an exclusive contract with anesthesiologists other than
plaintiff, which event was also beyond plaintiffs control. Specifically, the Court finds
that plaintiff was precluded from attempting to negotiate his own exclusive contract
with the hospital because it was impossible under the circumstances to locate and hire
certified registered nurse anesthetists within the two week period of time allowed by
the hospital.
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10.

Moreover, based upon the plaintiffs' testimony, the Court finds that

plaintiffs historical income is not a fair and accurate indicator of plaintiffs current
earning potential because it is extremely unlikely that plaintiff will be able to build up
a practice again in which he can supervise a large number of certified registered nurse
anesthetists as he was doing at Mountain View Hospital. The Court finds that it will
take several years for plaintiff to rebuild his medical practice in a new community and,
based on plaintiffs undisputed testimony, the Court finds that plaintiffs projected
income will probably be less than one-half of his historical income while practicing at
Mountain View Hospital.
11.

The Court is not persuaded by defendant's argument that plaintiff should

immediately pursue employment in other areas of medical specialty. The Court finds
that plaintiff completed a one year internship and a two year residency in
anesthesiology after receiving his medical degree and that plaintiff also has seventeen
years of experience as a practicing anesthesiologist. The Court finds that plaintiff has
made diligent efforts to rebuild a practice in his area of specialty as an anesthesiologist
and in fact, has acquired or is in the process of acquiring staff privileges at several
hospitals in Reno, Nevada, and in Las Vegas, Nevada to practice medicine once again
as an anesthesiologist. In addition, the Court finds that for plaintiff to pursue
employment in another medical specialty, it would take one to three years of additional
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training. Under the circumstances, the Court finds it would be unreasonable to expect
plaintiff to abandon his area of specialty as an anesthesiologist and pursue another area
of specialty.
Income of Defendant
12.

Based upon defendant's admission that she is currently employed as a

nurse practitioner with FHP of Utah, Inc. and based upon defendant's admission that
she entered into a Professional Employment Agreement with FHP on July 15, 1994,
which agreement was admitted into evidence as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 28, the Court
finds that defendant earns a salary of $45,500.00 per year, or $3,792.00 per month.
Child Support
13.

Based upon the Court'sfindingsstated above with respect to the parties'

respective incomes, the Court finds that plaintiff should not be ordered to pay child
support at the present time. In this regard, the Court finds that defendant's income is
sufficient to support the children in her custody on a temporary basis. However, the
Court finds that as soon as plaintiff begins to generate an income from his medical
practice, he should be required to report such income immediately to defendant and a
modified Court Order should issue ordering plaintiff to pay child support consistent
with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines based upon the parties' respective incomes
at that time.
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Findings Regarding Alimony
14.

Based upon the criteria established in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d

841, 843 (Utah App. 1992) and Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994), the
Court makes the following specific findings with respect to alimony:
a.

Financial Conditions and Needs of the Parties. The Court finds that the

greatest financial need of the parties is the payment of debt. It therefore will be the
order of this Court, as set forth below, that all currently existing marital debts be
extinguished by the sale of the parties marital real property and other liquid assets.
The Court also finds in this same regard that the other drain on the disposable income
of this marriage, besides marital debt service, was caused by the horse business, which
business essentially has been liquidated. Therefore, the Court finds that the future
financial needs of plaintiff primarily will consist of housing, food, clothing, malpractice
insurance, medical insurance, utilities, automobile maintenance, entertainment and other
incidentals. Specifically, based upon the statement of monthly expenses included in
plaintiffs Financial Declaration filed with the Court, plaintiff reported the following
monthly expenses exclusive of debt service and support obligations:
Medical insurance
Property taxes
Vehicle operation and maintenance
(gas, oil, lube and repairs)
Electricity - Loafer Canyon Home
Electricity - Payson Ranch house

$ 200.00
200.00
400.00
80.00
150.00
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Rent and food
Other living expenses
Malpractice insurance
Disability insurance

1,000.00
750.00
1,000.00
$ 900.00

Total

$4,680.00

Likewise, the Court finds that defendant's future monthly expenses, exclusive of
monthly debt service, will consist primarily of the mortgage payment, utilities payments,
food, clothing and other incidental living expenses. Specifically, defendant reports the
following monthly expenses in her Financial Declaration filed with the Court:
Mortgage, real property tax
and real property insurance
Maintenance
Food and household supplies
Utilities
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning
Clothes
Medical and dental
Life insurance
Child care
School
Entertainment
Incidentals
Automobile expense
(gas, oil, repair, insurance)

$ 400.00

Total

$5.980.00
b.

$1,570.00
200.00
1,200.00
300.00
350.00
100.00
500.00
60.00
100.00
400.00
400.00
200.00
200.00

Ability of parties to provide for themselves. Because of plaintiffs

loss of employment, the Court finds that he is temporarily unable to provide for
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himself without selling off assets and applying the proceeds to paying his living
expenses. The Court finds that defendant's employment provides her with the ability to
provide for herself. The Court finds that neither party is currently capable of paying
the monthly expenses reported in their respective Financial Declarations, but the Court
further finds that the monthly expenses reported by the parties are unrealistic and
unattainable in light of plaintiffs loss of employment.
c.

Ability of parties to provide support. The Court finds that neither

the plaintiff nor the defendant is able to provide support to the other under the
current circumstances.
d.

Other factors. Also with respect to the issue of alimony, the Court

finds that this marriage was of short duration, that the parties are both well educated
and capable of favorable employment, that the defendant was employed prior to the
marriage and during the marriage as a nurse practitioner, was also employed full-time
during this marriage in the horse business, and is currently employed as a nurse
practitioner, and that plaintiffs earning potential has been seriously and permanently
diminished, at least in part, because of defendant's numerous allegations of misconduct
against plaintiff. The Court further finds that the parties have resided together as
husband and wife for only about three years and that plaintiff has paid defendant
alimony of over two years since the parties first separated in April of 1992. The Court
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therefore finds that under all of the above circumstances, viewed cumulatively, it would
be unfair and inequitable to award either party alimony.
Separate Property
15.

General At the hearing, plaintiff admitted as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 a

detailed statement of assets listing both the real and personal property of the parties.
In the left-hand column of plaintiff's statement of assets, plaintiff designated the
property into the following five categories:
M = marital property of the parties
S/S = defendant's separate property currently in the possession of defendant
S/D = plaintiff's separate property currently in the possession of plaintiff
S/D* = plaintiff's separate property currently in the possession of defendant
S/D** = plaintiffs separate property currently being held in impound by the
Utah County Sheriffs Department
16.

In response to plaintiffs statement of assets, defendant admitted

defendant's Exhibit No. 51 which is the same statement of assets admitted by plaintiff,
only with defendant's handwritten notes on the statement. At the hearing, defendant
indicated that she did not agree with plaintiffs designation of the property as either
marital or separate property but defendant did not provide any testimony as to how
she would designate the property differently. In addition, defendant failed to provide
any testimony explaining her handwritten notes on her Exhibit 51, which notes are
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virtually impossible for the Court to understand. The Court therefore adopts plaintiffs
Exhibit 3 as a true and accurate statement of the parties assets and the Court
furthermore adopts plaintiff's designation of the assets as either separate or marital
property of the parties.
17.

Plaintiffs separate real property.
a.

The Court finds that the home in Loafer Canyon in Salem, Utah,

plus the underlying ten acres were owned by plaintiff prior to this marriage and title to
such property has remained in plaintiffs name only. The Court therefore finds the
Loafer Canyon home plus the underlying ten acres is plaintiffs separate property.
While there was testimony from the parties that a metal building was erected on the
Loafer Canyon property during the marriage and that certain cosmetic improvements
were made to the property during marriage, all such improvements were financed by
borrowing against the Central Bank home equity line secured by the Loafer Canyon
home, which debt, together with all other debt secured by the Loafer Canyon property,
as set forth below, is found by the Court to be plaintiffs separate debt. As a result,
the Court finds it is fair and equitable that the Loafer Canyon Home and underlying
ten acres, together with all improvements thereon and all debts thereon, be deemed to
be the separate property of plaintiff.
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b.

In addition, the Court finds that plaintiff owned a one-seventh

interest in the St. George condominium prior to this marriage. While another oneseventh interest in the St. George condominium was purchased by plaintiff during this
marriage, the Court finds that the second one-seventh interest was purchased by
plaintiff by borrowing against the Central Bank home equity line of credit secured by
the Loafer Canyon home, which line of credit is deemed to be plaintiffs separate debt.
Therefore, under the analysis prescribed by Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah
1982), the entire two-sevenths interest in the St. George condominium is found to be
plaintiffs separate property.
c.

The Court also finds that plaintiff owned a condominium in Provo

at the time the parties married, which condominium would also be plaintiffs separate
property. However, the Provo condominium was sold during this marriage and the net
proceeds from the sale in the amount of $19,000.00 were applied to purchase 32 acres
of farm land in Lakeshore, Utah, which property has also been sold and the net
proceeds are currently held in an escrow account with Provo Abstract Company. The
Court finds that it is fair and equitable that plaintiff get credit for such $19,000.00
separate property from the proceeds of the Lakeshore property. However, because the
proceeds from the sale of the Lakeshore property are also partially marital property,
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the division of such proceeds will be addressed below as part of the division of marital
assets.
18.

Defendant's separate real property. Defendant brought a house from a

prior marriage into this marriage. When presented with the settlement statement
admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 52, Defendant admitted that her house from her
prior marriage was sold on November 19, 1991 and that after paying closing costs and
the mortgage balance, $32,470.26 cash was distributed to defendant, which money was
deposited the next day into defendant's separate checking account with Far West Bank
as evidenced by the Far West bank statement admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 53.
Based upon the testimony of the parties and based on the settlement statement
admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 29, the Court further finds that on July 8, 1994,
defendant purchased a residence and underlying 5 acres in Lehi, Utah for $205,000.00.
Defendant made a down payment on the purchase of such residence in the amount of
$46,157.86. Although technically defendant's purchase of this residence was in violation
of previous court orders against the sale or encumbrance of assets, and although the
Court finds that defendant's purchase of this residence was not in the best interests of
the marital estate inasmuch as the marital estate was already suffering from excessive
debt and defendant had the Loafer Canyon home and the Payson Ranch house she
could live in, thereby making the accumulation of additional debt unnecessary and
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leaving other assets of the marital estate vacant and unutilized, the Court nevertheless
finds that defendant's down payment for the purchase of this new residence came from
the equity from defendant's Alpine home brought into the marriage. The Court
therefore finds that the Lehi house is defendant's separate property inasmuch as the
property is currently in her own name and the mortgage on the property is in
defendant's name only as well.
19.

Plaintiffs separate personal property. Based upon the testimony of the

parties and upon plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 and based upon the criteria established in
Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), the Court finds that the following
property is plaintiffs separate property either owned prior to marriage or purchased
from the proceeds of separate property owned by plaintiff prior to marriage:
Accounts
Central Bank - Checking (Acct. No. 09-0091307231)
Piper Jaffray - Investment Account
Mountain High Community Credit Union (Acct. No. 248-01)
David W. Watson, M.D., P.C. Accounts
Zions First National Bank (Provo Branch) Acct. No. 033-111600
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Investments
Navwest Investors Limited Partnership (1982)
HIE Spanish Fork Utah partnership (Holiday Inn)
David W. Watson - Piper Jaffray Investment Account

Equipment
Kubota L2850 Tractor
Century sprayer (1987)
Tiller (1982)
Posthole digger (1983)
Loader attachment
Red Plow
Blue Cultivator

Vehicles
1982 Chevy Luv Pickup
Trailers
Brown Trailer
Red Trailer (12' x 5')

Furniture
Chest of drawers (master bedroom)
Hampton piano
Table with glass top (music room)
Refrigerator - non-working
Green Refrigerator (Ranch house)
Brass bed (Lindsay's room)
Jewelry chest
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Mahogany kitchen collection
6 chairs
Table + 2 leaves
Hutch
Serving table
Packard Bell 486DX Computer, Monitor, Keyboard, Printer and Software
Mita Copier (1984)
Computer workstation desk
Table and chair set (in apartment above garage)
Sansui Amplifier, Pioneer Tape Deck, CD Player, Tape Deck and Speakers
(1979)
Daybed
Mirrored medicine cabinet (was attached to wall)
9 drawer pine dresser
RCA 21" television
King size mattresses and box springs
Brother AX33 electric typewriter (1986)

Artwork
Sumner painting - Whales (1983)
Two (2) Charles Bragg lithographs (1983)
4 Madam Alexander Dolls

Jewelry
18,f gold rope chain

Tools
Transporting Dolly
Workmate workbench
Hand tools - hammers, pliers, wrenches, etc.
2 red Craftsman Tool Chests & enclosed tools
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Craftsman lawn mower (3 hp.)
Tiller
Miscellaneous Assets
Victorian china collection (brown & gold pattern)
Thimble collection
Spoon collection
Dr. Watson's pre-marital photograph album collection
Compact disc collection
Minolta 5000 Camera and lenses (wide angle and telephoto)
Electrical Stimulator
Swing trainer video
Exercise set
1 tennis racquet (Dr. Watson)
Luggage sets
Coleman stove
Coleman lantern
Garcia Mitchell 307 rod and reel
Video collection (approximately 75)
20.

In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff offered undisputed testimony and

admitted a schedule as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 38 detailing artwork belonging to the
Watson-Kendall Investment Trust which is still in the possession of defendant. The
Court finds that such artwork is in fact property of the Watson Kendall Investment
Trust and should therefore be returned to plaintiff as trustee of such trust. The
specific pieces of artwork belonging to the Watson Kendall Investment Trust are
described as follows:
Behren's painting - "Parasol"
Larsen painting - "Eagles"
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Larsen painting - "Werewolves"
Larsen painting - "Coveting Coup"
Auld lithograph - Jack Nicholson - Penguins
Auld lithograph - Andy Warhol - Fish in a tank
Auld lithograph - Marilyn Monroe - Fish in a tank
21.

Defendant's separate personal property. Based upon the testimony of the

parties and the Court's findings set forth above regarding designation of separate
property, the Court finds that the following property was defendant's separate property
owned prior to this marriage:
Accounts
Bank of American Fork - Savings (Acct. No. 41-085-2)
Bank of American Fork - Checking (Acct. No. 52-921-4)

Horses
Riggin
Diamond

Horse Tack & Equipment
English saddle
15" Western Saddle

Furniture
Water bed
Blue hide-a-bed couch
2 Blue naugahyde chairs
Chest of drawers (Travis' room)
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Refrigerator
IBM Computer & Printer
Sharp Television
GE Microwave
Two (2) brass lamps
Miscellaneous Assets
Mrs. Watson's photo albums

Marital Property
22.

Real property. The Court finds that the parties own, as marital property,

the following real property: (1) 1.2 acres adjacent to the Loafer Canyon Home valued
at approximately $10,000.00, (2) approximately 13 acres in Payson with a ranch house
and barn valued at $360,000.00, and (3) a timeshare interest in a condominium in
Maui, Hawaii valued at approximately $9,000.00.
23.

In addition, the Court finds that at the time of the parties' separation,

they owned 32 acres of farm property in Lakeshore, Utah which was sold, the net
proceeds of which were deposited with Provo Abstract Company, Inc. in escrow
account no. 23596. The amount currently held in such escrow account is $63,736.72.
24.

The Court furthermore is informed by the parties' legal counsel that

subsequent to the hearing in this matter, the parties 13 acres plus ranch house and
barn in Payson has been sold for $360,000.00, the net proceeds of which are to be held
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in escrow following closing by Courtesy Title Services pending a direction from this
Court regarding distribution. In addition, the Court is informed by the parties' legal
counsel that the parties' 1.2 acre tract adjacent to the Loafer Canyon Home has been
sold, the proceeds of which are to be held by Security Title Company pending direction
from this Court as to distribution.
25.

The Court finds that the sale of the 1.2 acres adjacent to the Loafer

Canyon Home plus the sale of the property in Payson plus the money held in escrow
by Provo Abstract Company will generate the following amount of cash available to the
marital estate:
1.2 acres adjacent to Loafer Canyon Home
Payson ranch house, barn and 13+ acres
Less 7% sales commission
Escrow - Provo Abstract Company, Inc.

$ 10,000.00
360,000.00
(25,900.00)
63,736.72

(Account No. 23596)
Total
26.

$407,836.72
As stated above, the Court finds that the parties are unable to service the

marital debt any longer. Therefore, the Court finds that it is necessary that the
proceeds from the sales of real property listed above be applied to the payment of
marital debt. Specifically, the Court finds that it is fair and equitable that the money
generated from the sales of the above-described property be applied to pay the
following marital debts:
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The Central Bank note (secured by the Payson barn)
The Chase Manhattan Mortgage note (loan no. 593326-6)
(secured by the Payson ranch house)
The David W. Watson, M.D. P.C. pension plan note
(secured by the Loafer Canyon home)
Mountain High Community Credit Union (secured by the
1993 Isuzu Rodeo) (Acct. No. 248-01)
First Interstate Bank Master Card
(Acct No. 5308-7000-0212-3266)
First Interstate Bank Executive Line
(Acct. No. 022-650-0035873-8001)
Central Bank Visa Card (Acct. No. 4758-8001-6000-1338)
MBNA America Credit Line (down payment on Payson barn)
(Acct. No. 749-90015-546-123)
MBNA America Credit Line (payment for horse tack & arena
at Payson Ranch) (Acct. No. 4800-1205-1201-8524)
MBNA America Credit Card (Acct. No. 5329-0315-2395-8130)
MBNA America Credit Card (Acct. No. 5329-0318-6612-5675)
Meridian School

$ 94,000.00

Total

$390.506.01

27.

124,546.00
45,000.00
15,000.00
3,414.15
23,725.67
9,500.00
14,674.06
14,289.08
31,518.57
4,838.48
10.000.00

The Court further finds that it is fair and equitable that the above debts

be paid directly out of the escrow accounts described above which hold the proceeds
from the sale of the parties' real property. In addition, the Court notes the amounts of
the debts listed above are the parties' best estimates as to amount and may not be
entirely accurate due to recently accrued interest or recently made payments.
Therefore, notwithstanding the amounts shown above, it is the Court's Order that the
above debts be paid in their entirety.
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28.

In recognition of the fact that plaintiff applied $19,000.00 from the sale of

his Provo condominium to the purchase of the Lakeshore property, the Court finds that
any funds remaining in escrow after payment of the above debts and any administrative
fees assessed by the companies handling such funds, up to $19,000.00, should be paid
to plaintiff. Any such funds in excess of $19,000.00 should be divided equally between
the parties.
29.

Personal property. The Court finds that the following is the marital

property of the parties excluding real estate, plaintiffs pension and trust or escrow
accounts:
Insurance Policies Which Have a Cash Value
Union Central Policy on Suzanne - cash value
Union Central Policy on McCade - cash value
Union Central Policy on Travis - cash value

Equipment
DR field mower
Rock rake
Flat-bed trailer
Over 150 feet of galvanized corral panels
Over 1,000' of metal arena panels plus 2 animal shoots & gates
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Vehicles
1993
1990
1993
1972

Pontiac Grand-Am
One-Ton Chevy Pickup
Isuzu Rodeo
Ford Pickup
Trailers

Silver 2-horse Trailer

Horses
Rainbow's San Peppy
Willie Expensive
Horse Tack & Equipment
Gary Warner saddle
Child's english saddle
15" Western Saddle
15 hoods & 15 blankets
5 saddle blankets
15 lead ropes
15 halters
5 Bits
7 silver inlaid (7 large - 2 yearling)
"World" belt buckle
2 belt buckles won in Elko in 1991
Las Vegas belt buckle
5 belt buckles awarded at AQHA Banquet
25 trophies
Show boots, clothes and hats
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Furniture

Lodge pole bed for children
Cabinet with glass doors (master bedroom)
Two (2) maroon naugahyde chairs and ottoman
Bed (Scott's room)
Nursery crib
Nursery cradle
Nursery changing table
Gun safe
Expresso maker
Bread maker
Double bed and frame
King size bed & headboard (Loafer Canyon)
White couch, love seat, tapestry chair, end tables,
center table with western pattern couch, love seat
Washing Machine (Loafer Canyon)
Dryer (Loafer Canyon)
Freezer (Loafer Canyon)
Western pole-framed love seat, couch, 1 chair
Western pole-framed end tables
45" Big Screen T.V. (Loafer Canyon)
Fruit dehydrator
Canoe
2 children's bicycles
2 mountain bikes
2 16' aluminum extension ladders
Child's wagon (Burley) to attach to bicycle
Skis, ski poles, boots, ski outfits
Ski outfit
Artwork
Friedman lithograph - Indian Warrior (Gift to Dr. Watson)
Rodriguez lithograph - Mountain Man #1
Rodriguez lithograph - Mountain Man #2
Pardell Sculptures
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Johnson's Last Flight (artist's proof)
(2-3) Defiant Commance (artist's proof)
Unexpected Warrior/Rescuer (artist's proof)
(2) No More Forever (artist's proof)
3rd Defiant Commance (artist's proof)
(2) First Coup (numbered piece)
Sacajwea (numbered piece)
Crow Warrior (numbered piece)
Tables Turned (numbered piece)
Latest Medicine Man (numbered piece)
No More Forever (numbered piece)
Rustin a Heard Quitter (numbered piece)
Douglas Lee Painting - Indian Mother with baby on back
Douglas Lee Paintings
Barn
Stick people #1
Stick people #2
Indian Silhouette
Monet lithograph
Monet lithograph
Lautrac lithograph
Pizarro lithograph - Market Scene
Bev Doolittle lithograph - Coyote & Rainbow (framed)
Bev Doolittle lithograph - Coyote & Rainbow (unframed)
Jewelry
9mm wedding band with 1 caret marquis diamond, 2 sapphires,
2 emeralds and 2 diamonds
6mm wedding band with 2 diamonds, 1 emerald, 1 sapphire
White gold bracelet with "Suzi" in diamond chips
Gold bracelet with dolphin's head (1991 Hawaii)
Gold bracelet with whale fluke (1992 Hawaii)
Gold circular Chinese pendant with gemstones
Sapphire and diamond earrings, necklace and matching pendant
Half-caret diamond earrings
Round gold earrings to match wedding ring with emeralds, etc.
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Emerald and diamond gold earrings
18" heavy gold rope chain
Men's wedding band with two (2) diamonds, one (1) sapphire
and one (1) emerald
Gold ring with star sapphire (Lake Tahoe 1988)
Amethyst and diamond necklace with matching earrings
2 Gold filigree gold rings
Sterling silver elk head with emerald eye
7mm 20" gold herringbone necklace
Hawaiian heirloom ring (1991 Hawaii)
Hawaiian heirloom bracelet (1991 Hawaii)
Other gold and silver earrings, necklaces and rings, etc.
7 mm men's wedding band with two (2) diamonds,
one (1) sapphire and one (1) emerald
Man's ring with smokey sapphire

Tools
Arc Welder
Scroll saw
Mitre - crosscut saw
Makita drill set with charger and batteries
Dremel sanding set + 40 attachments
Journeyman victor acetylene welding set
Diesel heater (bullet type)
Miscellaneous Assets
Anderson knife
12 gauge Browning shotgun
Bolt-action 22 gauge rifle
Barbecue (unassembled) + 5 gallon propane tank
Barbecue + two 5 gallon tanks
3 tennis racquets (Mrs. Watson)
Boston Trader sweater with nautical design
Luggage (cloth and leather)
2 Backpacks
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Backpack
4 children's backpacks
6 sleeping bags (below 0°)
4-man tent
Fishing tackle box with tackle
5 rods and reels
Dr. Watson's clothing and personal affects
• aqua green AQHA jacket
- red Mr. MBJ Opie jacket
Post marriage photo albums and videos
Video collection (approximately 175)
Sony video camera
Sears lifestyler treadmill
Christmas china collection
Christmas decoration collection
Portable compact disc player
Ski training machine
Watch dog - Blue
Australian shepherd - male
Australian shepherd - female
2 Rotweilers
It is fair and equitable that the property designated above be equally divided between
the parties. The parties should agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of
these Findings. Should the parties be unable to agree on an equitable division, plaintiff
should make two (2) lists for division of the personal property not specifically set forth
herein. Defendant should be allowed to select either of the two (2) lists prepared by
plaintiff as in her sole discretion she desires and the property on that list shall be
awarded to her and the property on the other list awarded to plaintiff. Should
defendant decline to select either list prepared by plaintiff within 30 days of entry of
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these Findings, then all personal property should be sold by a court appointed master
and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. The parties should be
permitted to bid on any item sold. The cost of the services of the master should be
paid from the proceeds of sale before distribution to the parties.
30. The Court further finds that in addition to the above-described marital
property, the parties own a timeshare in Maui, Hawaii. The Court reserves the Maui
timeshare for balancing the equities of the parties as set forth below under the heading
"Equitable Offsets."
Division of Debts
31. Plaintiffs separate debts. As stated above, the Court finds that the
Loafer Canyon Home and underlying 10 acres is separate property of the plaintiff.
The Court further finds that the mortgage loan from Crossland Mortgage Corporation
in the amount of $150,945.47 (Loan No. 2205169) secured by the Loafer Canyon Home
was plaintiffs separate debt from prior to this marriage. The Court also finds that the
$20,000.00 note to Kirton & McConkie secured by the Loafer Canyon Home is
plaintiffs separate debt incurred by the plaintiff after the parties' separation. In
addition, the Court finds that the home equity line loan at Central Bank (Account
No. 09-0097950166) in the amount of $111,801.13 also secured by the Loafer Canyon
Home was incurred to purchase plaintiffs partnership interest in HIE Spanish Fork
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Utah Partnership (Holiday Inn) set forth above as plaintiffs separate property, together
with plaintiffs interests in the St, George timeshare and also to construct the metal
building on the Loafer Canyon property and to make the cosmetic improvements to
the Loafer Canyon property. Because all of the above items have been awarded to
plaintiff as plaintiffs separate property in accordance with the Preston decision, the
Court finds that the Central Bank home equity line is also a separate debt of the
plaintiff.
32. In addition, based upon the testimony of the parties and the Statement
of Assets admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, the Court finds that the following debts
are also plaintiffs separate debt:
Zions Visa Bank Card
Central Bank - Speakeasy account
33.

$3,500.00
$9,500.00

Defendant's separate debts. Based upon the Court's finding above that

the residence purchase by defendant in Lehi, Utah and the underlying five acres shall
be deemed defendant's separate property, the Court also finds that the mortgage loan
on defendant's home with North American Mortgage Company in the amount of
$164,000.00, which loan was unilaterally incurred by defendant after the parties'
separation, also shall be deemed defendant's separate debt. In addition, the Court
finds the following are also defendant's separate debts which were incurred by
defendant after the parties' final separation:
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Nordstrom
Central Bank VISA
Discover
RC Willey
Victoria Secret
Cellular One

$1,000.00
1,500.00
1,500.00
1,500.00
200.00
200.00

ZCMI
34.

500.00
The Courts finds that Gail Stringham, Ph.D. asserts a claim relating to

psychiatric counselling provided to defendant and the minor children in defendant's
care and custody. The Court further finds that such psychiatric care was provided
without plaintiffs consent and without consulting the custody evaluator as ordered by
Commissioner Maetani in his June 6, 1992 temporary order. It would clearly be unfair
and inequitable to require plaintiff to pay the debt to Dr. Stringham when plaintiff was
precluded from any participation in the therapy services provided and when defendant
unilaterally requested and authorized such services and without consulting with the
Court, with plaintiff or with the custody evaluator. The Court therefore finds that it is
proper, fair and equitable that defendant assume and hold plaintiff harmless from the
debt to Dr. Stringham.
Child Support Arrearage
35.

On the issue of child support arrearages, the Court has reviewed the

order of Juvenile Court Judge Leslie D. Brown dated May 20, 1994 authorizing child
support payments to be paid out of the $30,000.00 held in the trust account of
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defendant's legal counsel. Based upon the undisputed testimony of plaintiff that child
support payments were made by plaintiff up through April 5, 1994, when plaintiff
become unemployed, and based upon defendant's testimony that the full $30,000.00
held in her attorney's trust was distributed to her to pay child support from April 5,
1994 forward, the Court finds that it is fair and reasonable that plaintiff receive credit
for the following child support payments paid out of such trust account:
April 20, 1994
May 5, 1994
May 20, 1994
June 5, 1994
June 20, 1994
July 5, 1994
July 20, 1994
August 5, 1994
August 20, 1994
September 5, 1994
September 20, 1994
October 5, 1994
October 20, 1994
November 5, 1994
November 20, 1994
December 5, 1994
December 20, 1994
January 5, 1995
January 20, 1995
February 5, 1995
February 20, 1995
March 5, 1995
March 20, 1995
April 5, 1995

$1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
100.00

Total

$30.000.00
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36.

The Court also finds, however, that such support payments were made to

defendant after plaintiff had become involuntarily unemployed. In addition, the Court
finds that the above support payments after August 1, 1994 were excessive in light of
defendant's unemployment as of that date with FHP. Therefore, the Court finds that it
is fair and reasonable that plaintiff receive an equitable credit in the amount of
$15,000.00 for child support overpaid. This equitable credit shall be handled as set
forth below under the heading "Equitable Offsets."
Rents from Payson Property
37.

The Court finds that defendant received $12,000.00 in rent from the

Payson property, which property is a marital asset. It is fair and equitable that plaintiff
receive an equitable credit for one-half of such rents, which equitable credit will be
balanced with other equitable credits below under the heading "Equitable Offsets."
Retirement Accounts
38.

Separate Accounts. The Court finds that prior to the parties' marriage,

the parties each had individual retirement accounts which were not contributed to
during this marriage and which therefore are the parties' separate property. It is
therefore fair and reasonable that the parties each be awarded their own individual
retirement accounts.
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39.

Plaintiffs Pension.
a.

The Court finds that plaintiff has a pension plan with his

professional corporation, which pension plan was in existence prior to this marriage,
but to which he made contributions during this marriage. Based on the testimony of
the parties and on the accounting for plaintiffs pension plan submitted as plaintiffs
Exhibit No. 2, the Court finds that as of the date of the parties* marriage, plaintiffs
pension plan had a present value of $263,182.82. Following the requisite analysis set
forth in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602-03 (Utah App. 1994), the Court
finds that it is fair and equitable that plaintiff be awarded the present value of his
retirement plan as of the date of the parties' marriage plus any appreciation accruing
during the marriage on such value accumulated in the profit sharing plan prior to the
parties' marriage.
b.

The Court also finds that during the parties' marriage, plaintiff

made annual contributions to the pension plan in the following amounts:
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

$13,552.42
43,518.80
23,702.27
23,082.68
7,050.00

Calendar year 1994

0.00

c.

year
year
year
year
year

Based upon the analysis required by Chambers v. Chambers, 840

P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1982), the Court finds that the preferred method for treating
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retirement plans in divorce proceedings is to fix the spouse's respective shares in the
pension plan and then satisfy the non-employee spouse's share out of other assets of
the marital estate, thereby leaving all pension benefits to the employee spouse. To
determine the defendant's share in plaintiffs pension, the Court finds that it is fair and
equitable that defendant be given credit for one-half of the contributions made to the
pension, together with one-half of all appreciation accrued on such contributions. In
this particular case, the Court finds that it would be virtually impossible to exactly trace
the contributions into the pension and thereafter calculate the appreciation on such
contributions. Therefore, the Court finds it is fair and equitable to simply prorate the
appreciation accrued in the pension equally between the accumulated value prior to
marriage and the contributions made during marriage. In this regard, the Court makes
the following calculation to fix the portion of plaintiffs pension that would be plaintiffs
separate property as opposed to the portion of plaintiffs pension that would be marital
property.
MARITAL
Valuation as of 12/31/88
1989 - Contributions less Expenses
1989- Appreciation

SEPARATE
263,182.86

263,182.86

36,189.91

12,875.00
36,189.91

299372.77

31X247.77

12,875.00

Valuation as of 12/31/89

12,875.00
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COMBINED

1990 - Contributions less Expenses
(43,518.80 - 3,614.53)
1990 - Marital Appreciation
(11,096.46 x (12,875.00/312,247.77))
1990 - Separate Appreciation
(11,096.46 x (299,372.77/312,247.77))
Valuation as of 12/31/90

39,904.27

39,904.27

457.54

457.54

53.236.81

1991 - Contributions less Expenses
(23,702.27 - 2,706.22)
1991 - Marital Appreciation
(51,199.93 x (53,236.81/363,248.50))
1991 - Separate Appreciation
(51,199.93 x (310,011.69/363,248.50))
Valuation as of 12/31/91

Valuation as of 12/31/92

Valuation as of 12/31/93

363.248.50

7,503.74

7,503.74
43.696.14

43,696.14

353.707.83

435.444.43

21,762.80

21,762.80

(1,432.38)

(1,432.38)
(6,198.52^1
347.509.31

(6.198.52}
449.576.33

199.91

199.91

1,135.11

1,135.11

103.402.04
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310.011.69

20,996.05

102.067.02

1993 - Contributions less Expenses
(7,050.00 - 6,850.09)
1993 - Marital Appreciation
(4,999.83 x (102,067.02/449,576.33))
1993 - Separate Appreciation
(4,999.83 x (347,509.31/449,576.33))

10,638.92

20,996.05

81.736.60

1992 - Contributions less Expenses
(23,082.68 - 1,319.88)
1992 - Marital Loss
(-7,630.90 x (81,736.60/435,444.43))
1992 - Separate Loss
(-7,630.90 x (353,707.83/435,444.43))

10.638.92

3.864.72

3.864.72

351.374.03

454.776.07

1994 - Expenses
1994 - Marital Loss
(.39,447.65 x (103,402.04/454,776.07))
1994 - Separate Loss
(-39,447.65 x (351,374.03/454,776.07))
Valuation as of 12/31/94
40.

(7,307.11)

(7,307.11)

(8,969.18)
(30.478.47^
$87,125.75

$320,895.56

(30.478.47^
$40&021.31

With respect to the $87,125.75 which is determined by the above

calculation to be the marital portion of plaintiffs pension, the Court finds that it fair
and equitable that defendant receive an equitable credit for one-half of such value in
the amount $43,562.88. The treatment of this equitable credit is set forth below under
the heading "equitable offsets."
Plaintiffs Accounts Receivable
41.

The Court finds that plaintiffs medical practice generates accounts

receivable for professional services rendered. Based upon the testimony of the parties
and the accounts receivable summaries admitted into evidence plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1,
the Court finds that as of the date of the parties' marriage, plaintiff had accounts
receivable from his medical practice in the amount of $242,044.81. The Court finds
that it is fair and reasonable that the accounts receivable that plaintiff brought into the
marriage be deemed plaintiffs separate property. The Court further finds that such
accounts receivable remained relatively constant in amount over the term of this
marriage until plaintiff lost his employment and was forced to draw upon his accounts
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receivable to pay the marital debt of the parties. Moreover, the Court finds that as of
the date of plaintiffs loss of employment on April 1, 1994, plaintiff had accounts
receivable of $249,409.97. Based upon the testimony of the parties and the schedule of
monthly debts service payments admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4, the Court finds
that following Dr. Watson's loss of employment. Dr. Watson paid approximately
$9,000.00 per month towards payment of marital debt, or a total of $117,000.00
($9,000.00 x 13 months) up to the date of these Findings. In other words, Dr. Watson
depleted his separate accounts receivable in the amount of $117,000.00 to pay marital
debt from April 1, 1994 to date. The Court finds that because such debt service
benefitted both parties and because it came from plaintiffs separate property and not
his income, it is fair and equitable that plaintiff be given an equitable credit of onehalf of such payments in the amount of $58,500.00.
42.

Also based upon the parties' testimony and the accounts receivable

summaries admitted into evidence as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1, the Court finds that as of
the date of the hearing in this matter, plaintiffs accounts receivable had been reduced
to approximately $11,005.08. The Court finds that besides paying marital debt, plaintiff
was forced to reduce his accounts receivable to this level in order to provide for his
own living expenses and to pay travel expenses associated with plaintiffs search for
employment through the western states. The Court finds that because of the amount
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of accounts receivable that plaintiff brought into the marriage as separate property, the
ending balance of plaintiff's accounts receivable should be awarded to plaintiff.
Funds Held in Attorneys, Trust
43.

Based upon the testimony of the parties and upon plaintiffs Exhibit

No. 3, the Court finds that there is $20,234.00 in a trust account with plaintiffs legal
counsel. The Court reserves treatment of this trust account for the section of these
Findings under the heading "Equitable Offsets."
Attorneys' Fees and Costs
44.

The Court finds that the division of the marital estate will put the parties

in equal position to pay their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this divorce
proceeding. The Court therefore finds that it is fair and equitable that each party be
ordered to pay their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this action.
Medical and Dental Needs of the Children
45.

The Court finds that defendant has medical and dental insurance

available to her through her employer and therefore finds that it is fair and equitable
that defendant should be ordered to maintain such medical and dental insurance on
McCade and Lindsay. The parties will contribute equally to all uninsured medical and
dental expenses of McCade and Lindsay.
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Tax Exemptions
46.

It is fair and equitable that defendant, as the custodian parent, be entitled

to claim McCade and Lindsay as exemptions for income tax purposes; provided,
however, that plaintiff shall be entitled to purchase the tax exemptions for Lindsay and
McCade from defendant so long as plaintiff is paying child support for McCade and
Lindsay and so long as plaintiff pays to defendant the value, in terms of tax savings,
that defendant would derive from claiming McCade and Lindsay as exemptions on her
returns.
Proceeds from Sale of Horses
47.

Based upon the testimony of the parties and plaintiffs Exhibit No. 30 and

defendant's Exhibit No. 47, the Court finds that defendant sold several of the horses
acquired during this marriage for $68,725.00 and that defendant deposited such
proceeds into her own separate bank accounts. Based upon the testimony of the
parties and representations by legal counsel and based upon Sid Gilbert's audit report
admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 34, the Court finds that defendant has failed to
adequately account for expenses relating to the care and maintenance of the parties'
horses. The Court has carefully examined defendant's Exhibit No. 48 which purports to
be an accounting of certain horse expenses and the Court finds that such accounting is
insufficient and lacking in documentation sufficient to allow plaintiff to verify such
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expenses. In addition, it was undisputed at the hearing that the accounting summary
admitted as defendant's Exhibit No 48 was provided to plaintiff foi the first time at
trial and not oiliiini .r. IIMII lull I 1 i iiiliu m 111 ni ni I Hinders and as reque steel on 1:11 1m 2 i • :: i is
occasions by plaintiffs legal counsel. The Court therefore finds it is fair and equitable
that defendant be solely responsible and receive no equitat le credit for whatever
expenses, if any, were incurred on behalf of maintaining the horse*.
Court finds that defendant received a financial benefit fron ''

:\

A herefore,
r

the

1 rises in the

amoi ii >f $<>tV72Ji IW mil I i \A

if

such proceeds in the amount of $34,362.50. The treatment of this equitable credit also
shall be discussed below under the heading "Equitable Offsets."
Allegations ot Contempt
' \t the hearing, both parties submitted evidence regarding the other
aliege(j

violations < ,

nns court orders in Ihis IMSC. In particular lh< (Viuil

finds that defendant made the following allegations against plaintiff:
a

First, defendant alleges that plaintiff was in contempt of the

issue, the Court finds that plaintiff entered the Payson Ranch property after defendant
had moved to Lehi ami had Liken the horses and her possessions with her, In
addition, the Payson Ranch property was in u ! • *

-

..* mn

v:

because of the electricity and heat being turned off. The Court also finds that plaintiff
caused no damage to the property. In fact, based on the testimony offered by Loran
Bingham, plaintiff removed garbage, and dead trees from the property and otherwise
cleaned the property to prepare it for sale.
b.

In addition, defendant elicited testimony from plaintiff that he had

sold assets in his pension plan in technical violation of the Court order against the sale
of any assets. In this regard, the Court finds that plaintiffs selling of assets in his
pension fund were arms' length transactions and that the pension plan received full
value for assets sold. Furthermore, the Court finds the proceeds from the sale of all
assets were kept in the pension. There was therefore no damage to defendant or to
the marital estate.
c.

Defendant further alleges that plaintiff violated an earlier order of

this Court when he directed his real estate agent to put a lock box on the Loafer
Canyon home. The Court finds that the Court had previously allowed plaintiff into the
Loafer Canyon home to prepare it for sale and that defendant had previously moved
from the Loafer Canyon home taking all the personal property with her except for one
bed and some cleaning supplies. The Court also finds that plaintiff instructed his real
estate agent to put a lock box on the Loafer Canyon home after certain property had
been removed from the Loafer Canyon home. The purpose of the lock box was
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merely to make a record of who had entered the property. In addition, the Court
finds that the installation of the lock box did not preclude plaintiff from entering the

;

combination and could let defendant into the house.
A

Defendant further elicited testimony that plaintiff had allowed

friemk In
Payson ranch. Plaintiff denied allowing friends to take equipment off of the Payson
rancl1

p r 0 p e r t ^ | ; } ;|t ^ e a( j m itted that he sold hay that was old and creating a fire

hazard on the property, plaintiff also testified that thr salt nil fiir 11;i', was In prnn.iir
the $1,000.00 income from the farm, business necessary to qualify for the agricultural
i 1 1 1 mii I i mi III! ni

mi11 ni i i 11s1111 in(' ii' s , t l i s Coi II I: finds that plaintiff "s sale of the hay

did not cause any harm t :> the marital estate. The Coui t also finds that defendant did
not direct friends to take equipment off of the Payson, ranch.
e

I

LIIII

nit i n i l l i mi mi iiiil'iii nlU'il irviniii iur

I il p l i m l i l l sold <i ti uli

m

which he lived in violation of the earlier court order against the sale of any assets.
I"!"* "1 '"ii M ( m i l ' 111 i

il II I HI mi |»( iiniiiil

t p p l u ' i l i hi 1 proceed'- l i o m tin 1 sale o l t h e

trailer to the payment of marital debt and that once plaintiff lost his employment and
moved to Reno, it would have been unreasonable to expect him to maintain the trailer
v;)Ca")< l i p t h n t i f

Jinn,

' I'IHIII t\\\t

i»-e.
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49,

At the hearing, plaintiff likewise elicited testimony regarding the following

alleged violations of Court orders:
a.

First, defendant admitted that she had sold furniture in violation of

the court orders.
b.

Defendant also admitted she had purchased her residence in Lehi

in violation of court orders against the encumbrance of assets.
c.

In addition, the Court finds that defendant did not adequately

account for the proceeds from sales of horses or for expenses incurred in the
maintenance of the horses.
d.

Defendant also admitted that she had sold a 6-horse trailer and

that she had changed the title of the parties' 1990 Chevy One-ton Pickup into her own
name, all in violation of the previous Court order against selling, secreting,
encumbering or otherwise transferring assets.
e.

Moreover, defendant admitted at the hearing that she had removed

fencing from the Payson ranch which fencing was secured into the ground by cemented
posts, which conduct was also technically in violation of previous court orders against
damaging marital assets.
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fc

Defendant also removed artwork from the Loafer Canyon hame

when she moved, which was also in violation of Commissioner Maetani's temporary
C
g.

Finally, defendant admitted that she did not disclose her

employment with F H J I plaintiff and that defendant continued to draw several months
-•*. • -is IIIUIIIM1 levels, Resides llii" I in I lllliir11 u e a t c d jin

of child support based nnni
unfair windfall i,? a Scndar

;

>;> a,t further damaged plaintiff and the marital estate

inasjiiiH ill .iii11. | ml .ill i if ill continued to pay the mommy private medical insurance premium
iri the amount of $600.00 per month for the defendant and the children after ttin - kid
become insured by defendant through her employer.
ill

I III 111 VI t i l l * I I I H I l i l L S t J i i K T S
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interests of justice or of the marital estate to make a finding of contempt and. impose
penalties on the respective parties a •-:.-> time

In this regai d, the Court finds that

although technical violations of
, :! r na; «iai est a it

violations have been relatively minor without substantia! .

In

ling penalty is not \\\ d , p

addit

best interests of justice or resolving the differences of this marriage. Nevertheless, the
l >urt admonishes the parties that although no finding of contempt will b e issued at
tins pru ni miI IIIIIII I I mimini I lln I i lull I ni fin i I i'i irsHvrs tlir ni ii'llil 1

-45-

nnsidei llin .ibuvr allegations

of contempt should there be any violations of the final Order of this Court. The Court
hereby states for the benefit of the parties that any further violations of the Orders of
the Court shall be penalized severely in light of the previous violations.
Equitable Offsets
51.

As found above, the parties are entitled to the following equitable credits:
Credits to Plaintiff

One-half child support overpaid
One-half of plaintiffs separate accounts receivable
depleted to pay marital debt
One-half of proceeds from sale of horses received by defendant
One-half of rental income received by defendant

15,000.00
58,500.00
34,362.50
$ 6,000.00

Total

$113,862.50
Credits to Defendant

One-half of marital portion of plaintiffs pension

$ 43,562.88

Total

$ 43,562.88

Difference in defendant's favor

$ 70,299.62

52.

To somewhat balance the inequity of the above entitlements to equitable

credits in defendant's favor, the Court hereby finds that it is fair and equitable that
plaintiff be awarded the parties' timeshare in the Maui, Hawaii condominium, which
timeshare interest is valued by the parties at $9,000.00, and that plaintiff also should be
awarded the $20,234.00 held in his attorneys' trust account.
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From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court hereby enters the following
conclusions of la » :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Neither party should be awarded alimony.
"I 111
A'he

I l l " ) !'»

1 ,','11

I I t i l l 11 11 " I l l V e .

parties5 real and personal property should be divided as set for th

above.

Fhe debts and obligations of the parties should be satisfied and divided as
s 21: ft M th above.
u.

Defendant aiiould be ordered tc

and dental insurance for th< Kneht *;i :u ninor children as v-;
7

w ab,\t

Tin1 iitMJik j | i ni miin I iJc11 ni I ii I expenses ul I In • miiiui children tvlik.h are not

covered by insurance should be divided as set forth above.
l H D this

_ _ _ _ (uy

()f

ioo<;
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I lonorable Ray M. Harding
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING CHILD
SUPPORT, ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERTY AND DIVISION OF DEBTS
was mailed this e2&$ day of April, 1995, by United States mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:
C. Robert Collins
Attorney at Law
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19
P.O. Box 54516
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah COUQW, State of Utah

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
Utah Bar #5455
13444 North 32nd Street, Suite 19
P.O. Box 54516
Phoenix, Arizona, 85078-4516
(602)

CARWA B. SMITH/Clerk
^

Deputy
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
nTM.'Tn

WARREN

WATSON,

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Civi.
SUZANNE WATSON,
..Judge Kay M, ll.udj.ng
Defendant.
THIS MATTER h a v i n g come on r e g u l a r l y f o r t r i a l
12,

1995,
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the

Honorable

appear' i nq wi t h IHM .it t i > i i M > >;
waLh

his
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attorney,

DANIEL

l

.Judge
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FINDINGS OF FACT
I .
residnnl

JURISDICTION & VENUE:

Plaintiff has been a bona fide

le State of Utah and Utah County for more than three

(3) months prior to the filing of this action. Venue is proper in
the above entitled Court.
2.

MARRIAGE: The parties were married on September 2, 1988

and divorced by bifurcated decree on January 4, 1995.
3.
visitation

CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION:
of

the

parties'

minor

The issues of custody and
child

McCADE

WATSON

and

Plaintiff's minor child LINDSEY WATSON have been resolved by
separate order of the Fourth District Juvenile Court filed in said
court on November 10, 1994. These were not issues at the trial on
April 11 and 12, 1995, and will not be addressed in these findings.
4.

BACKGROUND OF THE PARTIES: Plaintiff is a medical doctor

and Defendant is a nurse practioner.
4.1.

Plaintiff testified that he has been gainfully employed

as a doctor since his graduation from medical school some 17 years
prior to trial, but that he lost his employment on March 22, 1994
and has been unable to locate employment since that time. Plaintiff
testified that he did not want to practice other forms of medicine
other than that which he had been practicing. Plaintiff testified
that he could obtain other medical jobs, but that he would need
some retraining. Plaintiff has made no effort to retrain. Defendant
testified that some medical residents make up to $80,000 a year and
that such jobs are available.
4.2.

Plaintiff testified that he probably can work at a

hospital in Reno, Nevada, where he would make about $50,000 to
$75,000 the first year, about $100,000 the second year and about
$250,000 the third year.
4.3.

Defendant testified that she is a nurse practioner, but

that during the marriage of the parties she remained at home and
cared for her child from a prior marriage, the parties child and
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to work as a nurse

SEPARATE PROPERTY BROUGHT TO THE MARRIAGE:'

The parties

both had prior marriages and brought separate property into this
man: iaqe ,
b i, A t t h e t i m e of t h e m a r r i a g e of t h e p a r t i e s , P l a i n t i f f
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premarital home. (Exhibits 52 and 53).
5.3. Defendant testified that the proceeds of the sale of her
premarital home were given to Plaintiff to invest. Plaintiff
produced part of

Defendant's November 1991 deposit records which

showed that $32,470.26 was deposited on November 20, 1991 into
Defendant's separate bank account at Far West Bank and that the
next day on November 21, 1991, a check for $20,000 was written from
the account. (Exhibit 53)
5.4. Plaintiff admitted that Defendant gave him some money to
invest from the sale of Defendant's home and that he purchased
horses with the money, however, Plaintiff now claims that the
horses are marital property.

The records produced by Plaintiff

related to Defendant's separate bank account at Far West Bank *nd
on November 21, 1991, and do not show records of checks paid after
this date. Defendant's testimony in more creditable as to where
these

funds went. The records produced by Plaintiff

support

Defendant's testimony that she gave these funds to Plaintiff to
invent.
5.5.

Since Plaintiff claims the horses as marital property,

Defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for the $32,470.26 from
Plaintiff's share of marital property.
6.

REAL PROPERTY:

The parties' marital interest in real

property is as follows:
6.1.

The parties purchase(Kseveral pieces of real property

during the marriage. These purchases include 32 acres of land in
Lake Shore, a barn and a ranch/rental home.

The parties also
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7.

DEBTS: There is dispute about the present marital debts

of the parties. Plaintiff claims that a substantial debt still
exist somewhere in the neighborhood of $800,000. (Exhibit 5) When
this action was filed, Plaintiff testified that he filed with the
court a complete detailed list of all debts owned as of June 2,
1992. (See Exhibit 23) At that date, the total debts were listed at
$632,100.
7.1. On August 9, 1993, just prior to the second separation of
the parties, Plaintiff filed a credit application in which he list/**—
all debts at $588,400. (Exhibit 26) Plaintiff testified that this
statement properly represented the existing debts as of August 9,
1993.
7.2.

Plaintiff also testified that a number of the debts

listed in the June 2, 1992, court filing had been paid since that
time as follows:
June 2, 1992

7.3.

$632,100
9,000
12,000
4,200
800
3,500
20,000
43,000
15,000
3,500
15,000
2,200
1,600
53,000
1,000
500

Boat sold.
Maui Condo paid.
Zion VISA paid.
Sears paid.
Metal Building paid.
Carter Shields paid.
Motorhome sold.
6 Horse trailer sold.
Discovercard paid.
Utah CV Credit Union paid.
Associates Finance paid.
Nebo Vet paid.
30 acres sold.
Tires paid.
ZCMI paid.

$434,300

Total Unpaid debt
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at an imputed income for him. (Exhibits 7, 8, 20, and 14) The court
is required impute income to Plaintiff based on Cox v. Cox, 877
P.2d 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Utah Code §78-45-7.5(5)(6) and
(7).
8.1.

Plaintiff's

historical

income for his professional

medical practice is as follows: (Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16,
21 and 22.)
Year

Gross Income

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

$524,739
$529,509
$284,661
$593,846
$687,775
$695,752
$897,587
$920,644
$969,098

1994

$unknown

8.2. Plaintiff's historical income from his personal income
tax returns is as follows: (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 20, 21, & 22)

8.3.

Year

Gross Income

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

$217,339
$261,500
$224,000
$277,075
$unknown
$unknown
$440,300
$426,850
$455,150
$128,500

Plaintiff's gross monthly income for the purposes of

child support and alimony is $30,225. Defendant's income for the
purposes of child support and alimony is $45,500 a year or a gross
of $3766.67 per month. (Exhibit 28)
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-ed«£L. Plaintiff has been required t<5 pay child support of $1300 a
month per child, hb^ever, this wris based on the fact that there was
more than $632,100 inN^ehts at the time it was computed. The
marital debt is virtually paad or will be paid.

The children

deserve a monthly s>*pport paymerrbvof $2000 per child for a total
support payment of $4,000
11.

SUPPORT ARREARAGE:

Plaintiff was ordered to pay to

Defendant the sum of $1300 a month per child, plus $800 a month for
alimony. (Orders of June 2, 1992 and November 16, 1993.) In March
1994, Plaintiff stopped the payment of support.
11.1

From March 1994 until trial, Defendant received her

support payments from funds collected from an insurance company for
the death of a horse owned by the parties. Defendant has accounted
for these funds and the court approves the accounting. (Exhibit 50)
11.2. The court finds that the following payments should have
been made by Plaintiff for child support and alimony. (Exhibit 49)
March 1994
April 1994
May 1994
June 1994
July 1994
August 1994
September 1994
October 1994
November 1994
December 1994
January 1995
February 1995
January 1995
February 1995
March 1995
April 1995

$3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400
3400

Total

$54,400

11.3. From March 1994 until trial, Defendant's attorney paid
to her from the insurance funds held in his trust (above) the
following payments: (Exhibit 50)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

5,475.00
1,700.00
3,400.00
3,400.00
3,400.00
3,400.00
3,400.00
3,400.00
2,896.35

$27,071.35
11.3.

Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's

support
support
support
support
support
support
support
support
support

6/6/94
6/23/94
7/7/94
8/10/94
9/1/94
10/1/94
11/1/94
12/1/94
1/1/95

Total Paid

Had these funds remained in trust, each party would

have been entitled to one-half (1/2) of the funds. Plaintiff should
receive credit against past due child support and alimony in the
amount of $13,534.67 which is one-half of the insurance funds paid.
(Exhibit 50)
1.4.

Judgment should be entered against Plaintiff and in

favor of Defendant for past due child support and alimony in the
amount of $40,865.33 ($54,400.00 less $13,534.67)
12.

RETIREMENT PLANS: Plaintiff had a retirement fund at the

time of the marriage. (Exhibit 2)
12.1. Evidence shows that during the marriage, Plaintiff made
the following contributions to the plan from marital income:
(Exhibit 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16)
1988

$ 9,016

12.2.

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

$
$
$
$
$
$

13,552
28,269
23,702
12,118
34,752
none

Total

$14^23

V
/pj iLl O^f

The evidence shows that the value of the retirement

plan on December 31, of each year listed was as follows: (Exhibit
2)
Year

Value

Difference

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

$263,183
$312,248
$363,249
$435,444
$449,576
$454,776
$408,021

$ 49,065
$100,066
$172,262
$186,393
$191,594
$144,838

12.3. There has been considerable buying and selling in the
plan by Plaintiff who has exercised exclusive control over these
activities. Plaintiff sold assets and purchased new assets in
violation of this court's orders of June 2, 1992 and April 21, 1994
which prohibited these activities. (See also Exhibit 2 for the
years 1992, 1993 and 1994.)
12.4. Defendant was made a trustees with Plaintiff on the
retirement plan in 1992 which evidences an intent on the part of
Plaintiff to give Defendant a full interest in the plan. (Exhibit
27)
12.5

The court finds that Defendant has a one-half (1/2)

interest in the total value of the plan which one-half interest is

$204,010 as of December 31, 1994.
12.6.

This finding is supported by Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13,

and 16, which show that a difference between the value of the plan
in 1988 and the value of the plan on December 31, 1993, was
$191,594 and actual contributions made by Plaintiff during the
marriage of was $147,623.
13.

ACCOUNTS

RECEIVABLE:

At

the

time

of

the

second

separation of the parties in August 1993, Plaintiff had substantial
accounts receivable. He added to these each month and collected
from them each month until March 1994. (Exhibit 1)
13.1.

In March 1994, Plaintiff stopped adding to these

accounts receivable and started collecting them. The evidence shows
that he collected the following: (Exhibit 1)
Date
September 1993
October 1993
November 1993
December 1993
January 1994
February 1994
March 1994
April 1994
May 1994
June 1994
July 1994
August 1994
September 1994
October 1994
November 1994
December 1994
January 1995
February 1995
March 1995

Amount Collected
$ 83,535.08
63,362.70
69,897.68
42,567.61
66,359.37
80,883.52
59,265.38
70,258.28
47,289.60
14,314.62
6,590.38
6,686.75
3,635.25
2,655.20
1,145.44
567.57
1,294.14
732.69
1,259.25

Balance Due
$183,890.96
202,861.47
186,420.12
258,937.75
244,544.87
235,817.54
249,409.97
159,862.11
92,751.09
71,693.70
57,526.07
47,869.38
34,762.24
29,482.67
23,018.94
21,181.38
20,017.09
16,980.11
11,005.08

Total

$622,231.26
13.2.

From September 1993 until March 1994, Plaintiff had

expenses in connection with these accounts receivable, but did not
present evidence as to these expenses. The total collections from
September 1993 through March 1994 was $465,871.34. Historically,
Plaintiff has personally earned about 50% of his gross corporate
income. This is obvious when Plaintiff's corporate income tax
returns are compared with his personal income tax returns.
13.3. It is equitable to give Plaintiff credit for 50% of the
gross-income from September 1993 through March 1994, so that the
marital net interest in these accounts receivable during September
1993

through

March

1994

is one-half

of

the

$465,871.34

or

$232,935.67.
13.4.

For the period of April 1994 until trial, Plaintiff

collected $156,359.92. The total marital interest in the accounts
receivable from September 1993 through March 1994 is $389,295.59
which sum should be equally divided between the parties.
13.5.

Defendant is entitled to one-half of total marital

interest in the accounts receivable or $194,647.79.
13.6. Defendant is also entitled to one-half of any accounts
receivable collected after trial.
14.

BANK ACCOUNTS:

the parties
accounts.

in August

At the time of the second separation of
1993, Plaintiff

had a number of bank

14.1. The evidence shows that these accounts were as follows:
(Exhibit 25)
Date

Institution

8-31-93
8-31-93
8-31-93
8-31-93
9-21-93
8-31-93

Central Bank #2228
Central Bank #2236
Zions Bank #607912
Zions Bank #111600
Central Bank #7231
Mountain High C.R #248

Amount
$15,489.25
68,497.61
19,010.06
4,986.72
5,545.92
20,000.00
$133,529.56

14.2.

Defendant is entitled to one-half of these funds or

$66,7,64.78.
15.

FUNDS HELD IN TRUST:

There was $50,000 placed in the

trust account of Defendant's attorney from the insurance on the
death of a horse. Of this, each attorney received $10,000 and the
balance was paid to Defendant for alimony and child support. (See
paragraphs 11. )
15.1.

There are also funds held in a trust account by

Plaintiff's attorneys which represent the 1992 income tax refund of
the parties in the approximate sum of $30,000 plus interest. At
trial, Plaintiff did not provide an accounting for these funds and
should be required to do so.
15.2.

The balance of the funds remaining from the 1992 tax

returns should be divided equally between the parties. A total of
$10,000 has been paid from this account so that there would be
remaining about $20,000, plus interest.
16.

FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW:

The parties sold 32 acres of

property during the pendency of this action. The sale proceeds are
presently held in the trust account of Provo Abstract. From these
funds, each attorney has been paid $5,000. The balance of these
funds

should be

equally divided between

the parties

and is

discussed in paragraph 6.2 herein.
17.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: The personal property of the parties

shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall
agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a final order.
17.1.

Should the parties be unable to agree, Plaintiff shall

make two (2) lists for division of the personal property not
specifically set forth herein. Defendant shall be allowed to select
either of the two (2) lists prepared by Plaintiff as in her sole
discretion she desires and the property on that list shall be
awarded to her and the property on the other list awarded to
Plaintiff.
17.2. Should Defendant decline to select either list prepared
by Plaintiff within 30 days of entry of this order, then all
personal property shall be sold by a court appointed master and the
proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. The parties
shall be permitted to bid on any item sold. The cost of the
services of the master shall be paid from the proceeds of sale
before distribution to the parties.
17.3.

Either party may request appointment of a master to

sell the personal property not specifically set forth herein after

30 d^ys from entry of a final order.
17.4.

The personal property will include the Snyder Oil

Stock, the $60,000 interest which Plaintiff testified that he
purchased in the Holiday Express outside of the interest held by
the retirement plan discussed elsewhere in these findings, the St
George Condo, and the HONO KAA Vacation Plan in Hawaii.
17.5.

Plaintiff purchased a Fleetwood Mobile Home on April

22, 1992N^r $10,y5^l>Qs. He sold/thi^nobile home in August 1994
for $12,000. ^""Tne proceecis^oj/ sale shotb^d be/ divided equally
between the parties. (Exhibit 41)
18.

ATTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS:

Plaintiff has presented no

evidence as to his costs and attorneys fees. Defendant has filed an
affidavit of fees pursuant to court rules.
18.1.

The court has considered the factors set forth in Utah

Code § 30-3-3 (1984), Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, (Utah 1980), and
Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) related to an award
of attorneys fees and cost.
18.2.

The court finds the costs and fees of Defendant to be

reasonable and necessary and that due to the difference in the
earning abilities of the parties and considering all factors of the
law, Plaintiff should contribute $20,000 toward the payment of
Defendant's

attorneys

fees.

This

will

leave

Defendant

with

substantial attorneys fees to pay on her own.
18.3. There is a debt owing to Gilbert and Stewart for an

audit ordered by the court in the amount of $1120.00.

This debt

should be paid egually by the parties as ordered by the court on
January 25, 1994, and should now be paid from the trust account of
Plaintiff's attorneys prior to division of the funds held there.
18.4. Defendant should be entitled to her costs pursuant to
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
19.

MEDICAL & DENTAL NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN: Defendant should

maintain medical and dental insurance on the parties' minor
children in her custody so long as available to her through her
employment at a reasonable cost.
19.1. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-7.15, if health insurance
is a available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the
children would gain more complete coverage, then both parents
should be reguired to maintain insurance for the children.
19.2.

Plaintiff

shall

name

his

minor

children

as

beneficiaries on any life insurance policies that he now as or
obtains in the future sufficient to pay support in the event of his
death.
19.3.

Plaintiff should pay all uninsured medical and dental

needs of the children.
20.

DEBT TO DOCTOR GALE STRINGHAM: There is presently a debt

owed to Dr. Gale Stringham for the therapy needs of the children
and Defendant in the sum of $7912.00. (Exhibit 24)

In open court

on November 16, 1993, Plaintiff agreed to be responsible for the

payment of these fees and the court so ordered. Plaintiff should be
order to pay these fees and to hold Defendant harmless therefrom.
21.

TAX EXEMPTIONS:

Plaintiff should be entitled to take

LXN0SEY as a tax exemption if he is current in the payment of his
alimon\ and child support for the tax year involved.

Defendant

should be entitled to take McCADE as a tax exemption.
22.

HORSE BUSINESS:

The parties started a horse business

during the marriage. On June 2, 1992, the court ordered in
paragraphs 5 and 11 that Defendant operate that business, account
for profits or losses and sell the horse and hay as she deemed
proper.
22.1.

Defendant has accounted for the expenses and loss of

the business and the court approves her accounting. Exhibit (48)
22.2. During the last year that the parties resided together
the farm business operated at a loss of about $106,000. Because of
the income of Plaintiff and the tax advantage he received from the
loss, the actual cash loss to the parties was about $56,000.
22.3. Defendant has provided an accounting of the sales of
horses as required by the court. (Exhibit 47) The court approves
this accounting which showed total sales of $61,375.
22.4.

Defendant had additional income other than the horse

sales of $7,90.98. (Exhibit 48)
22.5. Defendant also provided the court with an accounting of
her expenses in connection with the business and selling the horses

which showed a total expenses of $71,763.56.
22.6.

The net loss of the horse business was $3,097.58.

Compared to the 1992 losses of the business of about $106,000, this
is a minimal overall loss for liquidation of the business.
22.7.

The liquidation of the horse was proper since horses

are income consuming and not income producing.
23.

WATSON KENDAL INVESTMENT: Plaintiff established what he

called a "family partnership" prior to the marriage. He put income
into this partnership by paying it certain funds to handle the
billing for his professional corporation. The partnership then
hired the services of a collection company and retained part of the
funds paid to it for the billing as income to the partnership.
23.1.

During the marriage, the following was paid to this

partnership by Plaintiff's professional corporation:
Year

Gross Income

1990
1991

$ 48,637
$ 46,480

1992

$ 48,505

Total

$143,622

23.2.

These were marital funds.

The partnership is made up

of Plaintiff's four (4) children from a prior marriage each of whom
has a 24% interest. Plaintiff is the general partner and has a 4%
interest.
23.3.

Defendant has custody of one (1) of the children who

has a 24% interest in this partnership; to wit: LINDSEY WATSON.

23.4. Plaintiff has sole control of this partnership. None of
the children have ever put any funds into the partnership.
23.5.

The partnership owns some valuable art work.

23.6. Defendant has as one-half interest in the funds placed
into this partnership during the marriage which is one-half of
$143,622 or $71,811.
23.7.

The art in Defendant's possession which is owned by

this partnership (Exhibit 38) should be retained by Defendant in
trust for LINDSEY WATSON who has a 24% in the partnership and who
is in Defendant's custody.
24.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION & OFF SETS: This is a proper case

for an equal distribution of assets and debts between the parties.
24.1. The assets of the parties should be divided as follows:
Assets/Debt
Lake Shore 32 Acres
Barn and ranch
Loafer Canyon
Retirement Plan
Accounts Receivable
Bank Accounts
Tax refund
Mobile Home
Watson/Kendal
Totals
24.2.

Marital

Plaintiff

Defendant

$ 63,000
$105,000
$ 50,000
$204,010
$389,296
$133,530
$ 20,000
$ 12,000
$143,622

$ 31,500
$ 53,000
$ 25,000
$102,005
$194,648
$ 66,765
$ 10,000
$ 6,000
$ 71,811

$ 31,500
$ 53,000
$ 25,000
$102,005
$194,648
$ 66,765
$ 10,000
$ 6,000
$ 71,811

$1,120,458

$560,229

$560,229

The court must provide for payment of the following

debts:
Gale Stringham:
$ 7,912
Marital debt
$37,300
Gilbert and Stewart $ 1,120

(From Exhibit 23)

24.3. Plaintiff should pay the debt to Gale Stringham as he
has been previously ordered to do so. Plaintiff should also pay the
remaining marital debts of $37,300, but should be granted a credit
against property awarded to Defendant. The debt to Gilbert and
Stewart should be paid from the trusts funds held by Plaintiff's
counsel prior to distribution.
24.4. There is a loss in the farm/ranch business since the
separation of the parties in the sum of $3,098. The parties should
equally pay this lost. Since Defendant has already paid it,
Plaintiff should reimburse her one-half or $1549.
24.5.

From Plaintiff's share of the marital property, he

should pay the following:
Funds from Defendant's premarital home:
Lump Sum Alimony
Support Arrearage
One-half of the farm loss

$32,470
$60,000
$40,865
$ 1,549

Attorneys Fees

$20,000

24.6.

Plaintiff should receive credit against his share of

the marital property awarded to Defendant for her one-half of the
payment of the marital debts of $37,300.
24.5.

To the extent that Plaintiff has already collected and

used funds awarded to Defendant herein or to the extent necessary
to pay his child support and alimony arrearage and lump sum alimony
award, Plaintiff should pay these funds to Defendant from his share
of funds currently held in escrow by his attorney, from his share
of funds being held by Provo Abstract, from his share of funds that

will be paid from the closing of the Loafer Canyon Home and from
his share of the funds to be received from the closing of the ranch
and farm property•
24.6.

The off sets should result in the following net result.
Plaintiff

Defendant

Assets
Debts
Attorneys fees
Defendant's home:
Lump Sum Alimony
Support Arrearage
Farm loss

$560,229
18,650
( 20,000)
( 32,470)
( 60,000)
( 40,865)
( 1,549)

$560,229
( 18,650)
20,000
32,470
60,000
40,865
1,549

Totals

$423,995

$696,463

25.

CONTEMPT:

The court has entered a number of orders in

this case to protect the parties and to insure that the debts were
liquidated and funds secured until trial. Defendant has violated a
number of the orders and admitted that he did so in open court.
This has caused Defendant to expend considerable funds in costs and
attorneys fees.

This conduct on the part of Plaintiff makes the

award of attorneys fees and the off sets proper.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The court should confirm the prior decree of divorce.

B.

The court should confirm the prior order of the Fourth

District Juvenile Court as to custody and visitation.
C.

In considering the relevant factors set forth in Pinion

v. Pinion, 67 P.2d 265 (Utah 1937), Foreman v. Foreman, 176 P.2d
144 (Utah 1946), Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App.

1988) and Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the
division of property in this case is equitable.
D.

The alimony award is mandated by the factors set out in

Anderson v. Anderson. 138 P.2d 252 (1943), Frank v. Frank. 585 P.2d
453 (Utah 1978), Martinez v. Martinez. 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991),
and Savage v. Savage.

658 P.2d 1201 at 1205 (Utah 1983)

Dated and signed this

day of May, 1995.

Judge Ray M. Harding
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the undersigned mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing on the o2&T{ day
of April, 1995, to Sam McVey and Daniel Goodsell, Attorneys at Law,
1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84111.

C. ROBERT COLLINS
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 924400816

vs.

DATE: May 26, 1995

SUZANNE WATSON,
Defendant.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling after a trial was held in this matter on
April 11 and 12, 1995 regarding the issues of child support, alimony, division of property and
division of debts. Having reviewed and considered the evidence and testimony admitted at
trial, having heard from counsel, and having reviewed the exhibits admitted and deeming itself
fully advised, the Court makes the following findings:
Findings of Fact
1. Plaintiff has been a bona fide resident of the State of Utah and Utah County for more than
three months prior to the filing of this action and the Court finds that jurisdiction and venue is
proper.
2. The parties were married on September 2, 1988, and divorced by bifurcated divorce on
January 4, 1995.
3. The issues of custody and visitation of the parties1 minor child McCADE WATSON and
Plaintiffs minor child LINDSEY WATSON have been resolved by separate order of the
Fourth District Juvenile Court. That court's findings were not issues at the trial on April 11
and 12, 1995 and will not be addressed in these findings.
1

4. Employment.
a. Plaintiff is a medical doctor and Defendant is a nurse practitioner. Plaintiff testified
that he has been gainfully employed as a doctor since his graduation from medical school
some 17 years prior to trial, but that he lost his employment on March 22, 1994 and has been
unable to locate employment since that time.
b. Plaintiff testified that he did not want to practice in another field of medicine other
than that which he had been practicing. Plaintiff testified that he could obtain other medical
jobs, but that he would need some retraining. Plaintiff has made no effort to retrain.
Plaintiff testified that he has made inquiry into various anesthesiology positions and that he
may be able to work at a hospital in Reno, Nevada, where he would make about $50,000 to
$75,000 the first year, about $100,000 the second year and about $250,00 the third year.
c.

Defendant testified that some medical residents make up to $80,000 a year and that

such jobs are available.
d. Defendant testified that she is a nurse practitioner, but that during the marriage of
the parties she remained at home and cared for her child from a prior marriage, the parties'
child and Plaintiffs children from his prior marriage. From the date of the parties last
separation until August 1994, Defendant was involved in taking care of the ranch/farm
business of the parties, caring for the children, and obtaining continuing medical education so
that she could re-enter the job market. In August, 1994, Defendant went to work as a nurse
practitioner making $45,500 a year.
5. Separate Property Brought to the Marriage:
a. The parties both had prior marriages and brought separate property into the
marriage.
b. At the time of the marriage of the parties, Plaintiff had an interest in a retirement
plan, interest in a time-share condominium, a home on Loafer Canyon Road, Salem, Utah and
some household furnishings. During the marriage Plaintiff commingled the assets of the
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retirement fund, revised the retirement fund and made Defendant a trustee of the fund and
made substantial contributions to the plan from marital assets. The Loafer Canyon home was
improved by the addition of a large metal building constructed with marital assets, completion
of the basement done with marital assets, the purchase of a strip of land with marital assets to
legalize the zoning, and redecorating of the existing home with marital assets.
c. At the time of the marriage between the parties, Defendant had separate property
which included a home, a vehicle and household furniture. Defendant rented the home when
she married Plaintiff and used the rental payments to pay the existing mortgage until the home
was sold on or about November 20, 1991. Defendant received $32,470.26 as her equity from
the sale of her home. The Court finds that the proceeds from the sale of this home were
given to Plaintiff to invest and that Defendant is entitled to reimbursement for this amount.
6. Real Property:
a. The parties purchased several pieces of real property during the marriage. These
purchases included 32 acres of land in Lake Shore, a barn and a ranch/rental home. The
parties also purchased a narrow strip of land next to the Loafer Canyon home in order to meet
zoning requirements.
b. The 32 acres of property was sold and the proceeds of $63,000 were placed in an
escrow account held by Provo Abstract Company.
c. A valid offer for purchase of the barn and ranch property had been obtained at the
time of trial, but the sale had not yet been closed. The listing agent testified that the present
offer of $360,000 was a valid offer and should be accepted. There are two debts remaining
on the ranch of $95,000 and $123,000 which leaves a marital equity of $106,000 after
deducting 10% for closing costs and realtor fees.
d. There is also a marital interest in the Loafer Canyon home due to the
improvements, additions and land purchased to correct the zoning. Plaintiff testified that the
narrow strip of land was purchased for $10,000 and the metal building, inclusive of labor, cost
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$32,000. There was no testimony as to the value of finishing the basement or the remodeling.
The Court finds that the marital interest in the Loafer Canyon home is $40,000.
7. Debts: Plaintiff claims that a substantial debt of approximately $800,000 still exists. At
the time this action was filed, Plaintiff filed a complete detailed list of all debts owned as of
June 2, 1992, listed in the amount of $632,100.
a. On August 9, 1993, just prior to the second separation of the parties, Plaintiff filed
a credit application in which he listed all debts at $588,400. The Court finds that this
statement properly represented the existing debts as of August 9, 1993.
b. With the selling of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and the rental/ranch house,
the court finds that using the June 2, 1992 schedule, there remains a total marital debt of
$37,300. The Court finds that Plaintiff should be responsible to pay the entirety of this debt
and any remaining marital debt.
c. Plaintiff was ordered in the June 2, 1992 order (signed June 8, 1992) at paragraph 5
not to take any action to further encumber the assets of the parties. The parties agreed on
October 29, 1993 (order signed November 16, 1993) that the June 2, 1992 order would remain
in effect.

The Court finds that any further debts incurred by the Plaintiff in violation of the

June 2 and October 29 orders are the separate debts of the Plaintiff.
d. The home purchased by Defendant after the separation of the parties is her separate
debt.
8. Income of the Parties:
a. The Court finds that Plaintiffs income will be imputed to him in the sum of
$80,000, an amount which he could earn as a resident in retraining, should he choose to do so,
or as an anesthesiologist, if he were willing to accept employment in a situation similar to the
Reno, Nevada opportunity. At such time that Plaintiffs earnings increase the Court would
consider a petition to modify child support based on a material change in circumstances.
b. Based on Defendant's admission that she is currently employed as a nurse
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practitioner, the Court finds that Defendant earns a salary of $45,500 per year.
9. Alimony: Based on the respective needs of the parties, the marital debt of the parties, and
both parties1 ability to be employed, the Court finds that an award of alimony to either party
would not be equitable or necessary.
10. Child Support: The Plaintiff should be required to pay child support based on the current
Child Support Guidelines until the children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high
school, whichever is later. Counsel for Plaintiff should prepare the appropriate child support
worksheets for submission to the Court.
11. Support Arrearage: By the Orders of June 2, 1992 and November 16, 1993, Plaintiff was
to pay temporary child support and alimony to Defendant in the amount of $1,300 per month
per child for child support and $800 per month for alimony.

From March 1994 until the time

of trial, Defendant received her support payments from a trust holding insurance proceeds
from death of a horse owned by the parties. The Court finds that judgment should be entered
against Plaintiff for past due child support and alimony in the amount of $54,400, subject to
an equitable offset for that amount paid by Plaintiffs interest in the trust account.
12. Retirement Plans:
a. Plaintiff had a retirement fund at the time of the marriage to which he made
contributions during the marriage from marital income.
b. The Court finds that during the parties' marriage Plaintiff made periodic
contributions to the pension plan in the following amounts:
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
Calendar Year
Calendar Year

$ 9,016.01 (deposited last qtr f88)
$13,552.42
$43,518.80
$23,702.27
$23,082.68
$ 7,050.00
-0-

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

c. The Court finds that the total amount of contributions made during the marriage

5

was $119,922.17 to which Defendant is entitled to a credit for one-half of that amount. The
Court finds that it is fair and equitable that Defendant not be entitled to any appreciation or
responsible for any loss on the account itself.
13. Accounts Receivable: At the time of the marriage Plaintiff had approximately $200,000
in accounts receivable. At the time of the separation of the parties and the termination of
Plaintiffs employment, Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 in accounts receivable. The
Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to retain $200,000 of accounts receivable as separate
property, therefore Plaintiff is entitled to retain all the accounts receivable.
14. Bank Accounts: The Court finds that any monies held in bank accounts belonging to the
parties or Plaintiff prior to the separation should have been used to pay debts. As Plaintiff is
to assume all debts he is entitled to any monies yet remaining in bank accounts.
15. Funds Held in Trust:
a. The Court finds that $50,000 from the insurance proceeds paid on the death of a
horse was placed in the trust account of Defendant's attorney. Each attorney received $10,000
of this, and the balance was paid to Defendant for alimony and child support. The Court finds
that each party has a one-half share in the trust account ($50,000 minus attorney fees paid).
b. There were also funds held in trust account by Plaintiffs attorneys representing the
1992 tax refund of the parties in the sum of $20,234.00, which should be divided equally
between the parties.
16. Funds Held in Escrow: The parties sold 32 acres of property during the pendency of this
action, and the proceeds are currently in a Provo Abstract trust account.

From these funds,

each attorney has been paid $5,000. The court finds that the balance of these funds should be
divided equally between the parties.
17. Personal Property:
a. The Court finds that the personal property of the parties shall be equally divided
between the parties. The parties shall agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a
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final order. The personal property will include the Snyder Oil Stock, the $60,000 interest
which Plaintiff purchased in the Holiday Express, the interest in the St. George Condo, and
the HONO KAA Vacation Plan in Hawaii.
b. Should the parties be unable to agree, Plaintiff shall make two lists for division of
the personal property from which Defendant shall select her choice of lists between the two
lists. The property on that list shall be awarded to her and the property on the other list
awarded to Plaintiff. Should Defendant decline to select either list, all personal property shall
be sold and the proceeds divided equally.
18. Attorney 's Fees and Costs:
a. The Court finds that considering the difference in the earning abilities of the parties
and all other factors in the relative positions of the parties Plaintiff should contribute $20,000
toward the payment of Defendant's attorneys fees.
b. Plaintiff should also pay one-half of the $1,120.00 debt owed to Gilbert and Stewart
for the audit prepared in the matter.
19. Medical and Dental Needs of the Children: Defendant should maintain medical and
dental insurance on the parties1 minor children in her custody so long as available to her
through her employment at a reasonable cost. Pursuant to Utah Code 78-45-7.15, if health
insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the children would gain more
complete coverage, then both parents should be required to maintain insurance for the
children. Plaintiff shall name his minor children as beneficiaries on any life insurance policies
he now has or obtains in the future. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be responsible to pay
one-half of all uninsured medical and dental needs of the children.
20. Debt to Dr. Gale Stringham: A $7,912.00 debt exists for the therapy needs of the
children and Defendant. The Court finds that Plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of
these fees, and Defendant will be held harmless therefrom with exception for the therapy costs
incurred by Defendant personally, which she shall be responsible for.
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21. Tax Exemptions: Plaintiff is entitled to take Lindsey as a tax exemption if he is current
in the payment of his child support for the tax year involved. Defendant is entitled to take
McCade as a tax exemption.
22. Horse Business: By order of the Court on June 2, 1992, Defendant was deemed
responsible for the horse business which was started by the parties during their marriage.
Defendant sold the horses and accounted for her business expenses, the net loss of the
business was $3,097.58, which loss Defendant should bear.

The Court finds that liquidation

of the horse business was proper.
23. Watson Kendal Investment:
a. Plaintiff had established a family partnership prior to the marriage which gained
income by handling the billing for his professional corporation. The partnership hired the
services of a collection company and retained part of the funds paid to it for the billing as
income to the partnership.
b. Plaintiff has a four percent interest in the partnership which is made up of
Plaintiffs four children from a prior marriage, each of whom has a 24% interest.
c. The Court finds that the payment to the partnership were for billing services
rendered by the partnership, and that the children's interest in the partnership funds should not
be disturbed. However, the Court finds that it would be just and equitable for Defendant to
share in Plaintiffs interest in the partnership funds contributed during the marriage. During
the marriage a total of $143,622 was paid to the partnership by Plaintiffs Professional
corporation in which Plaintiffs four percent interest would be $5,744.88 to which Defendant is
entitled to one-half or $2,872.44.
d. The artwork belonging to the partnership and which is now in Defendant's
possession shall be retained by Defendant in trust for Lindsey Watson who has a 24% interest
in the partnership and who is in Defendant's custody, as well as for the other beneficiaries of
the trust.
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24. Equitable Distribution and Offsets:

This is a proper case for an equal distribution of

assets and debts between the parties. Where one party has both a credit and a debt to the
other those amounts may be offset against each other.
25.

Contempt: Under the circumstances, the Court finds that it is not in the best interests of

justice or of the marital estate to make a finding of contempt and impose penalties on the
respective parties at this time. However, the Court may reserve any finding of contempt
should there be any violations of the final Order of this Court. In this regard, the Court finds
that although technical violations of court orders have occurred in this case, such violations
have been relatively minor without substantial injury to the marital estate.
26. Effective Date: The above findings shall be effective as of the date of trial in the matter
rather than the date of separation.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare a supplemental decree within 15 days of this
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum
decision has no effect until such order
Dated this 26th day of May,

cc:

i$Q&/^Jj%Jfe£o

^5^>.V....:C'.'A^

C. Robert Collins, Esq.
Samuel D. McVey, Esq.

9

Tab 9

FiLtD if!
4™ DISTRICT CCURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COl'HTY

Juul2 HzaMPSS
Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Thorn D. Walk (A5555)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT [SIC]
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 924400816

vs.

SUZANNE WATSON,
Defendant.

Judge Ray M. Harding

Plaintiff David W. Watson, by and through his counsel of record, hereby files his
Notice of Objection to defendant's proposed Order.
The bases for plaintiffs objection to defendant's proposed Order are more
specifically set forth in plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration which addresses the issues

and requests that the court not sign the proposed Order as submitted until it considers
the issues in plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this j™

day of June, 1995.

Samuel D. McVey
Thorn D. Walk
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing
NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT [SIC] DECREE OF
DIVORCE was mailed this 9^

day of June, 1995, by United States mail, postage

prepaid, to the following:
C. Robert Collins
Attorney at Law
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19
P.O. Box 54516
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516

-3-

Tab 10

Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704)
Thomas D. Walk (A5555)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A
NEW TRIAL

vs.

Civil No. 924400816

SUZANNE WATSON,

Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

Plaintiff, David Warren Watson, hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 59
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the equitable powers and jurisdiction vested
in this Court, to reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, more specifically, to reconsider and order a new trial of those

certain points raised and addressed in plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of this Motion and filed herewith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ j

^day of June, 1995.

KIRTQN & McCQNKIE

Samuel D. McVey
Daniel V. Goodsell
Thomas D. Walk
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A NEW TRIAL was mailed this
\^HK day of June, 1995, by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
C. Robert Collins
Attorney at Law
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19
P.O. Box 54516
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516

C^X>6^\»^^ Cl ,t>-^e^-St^r

G VWALK\WATSON\MOTION.REC
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JL;

Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Thomas D. Walk (A5555)
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A
NEW TRIAL

SUZANNE WATSON,
Civil No. 924400816
Defendant.
Judge Ray M. Harding

Plaintiff, David Warren Watson, ("Dr. Watson") respectfully submits this
memorandum in support of his Motion For Reconsideration or For a New Trial of certain
points specified in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, signed by the Court on May 26, 1995.

I. Introduction
This case involves a divorce proceeding between Dr. Watson and defendant,
Suzanne Watson ("Mrs. Watson"). A two-day trial was held on April 11 and 12, 1995, at
which time this Court heard the evidence presented by both sides with respect to the
division and distribution of assets between Dr. Watson and Mrs. Watson.
Thereafter the Court prepared and entered its Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 26, 1995 (the "Memorandum Decision").
After a complete review of the Memorandum Decision, Dr. Watson respectfully moves
this Court to reconsider several points of the Memorandum Decision and to order a new
trial on those issues.
In addition, and pursuant to the Court's request, Mrs. Watson has prepared a
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which more or less, is her proposed final order in this
matter, to which Dr. Watson objected to the entry thereof and served notice of objection
on or about June 9, 1995.
II. Argument
. . . [A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in
an action tried without a jury, the Court may open the
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment. . . .
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(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice; or
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or that it is against the law.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
1.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 4, Employment

subparagraph (c): "Defendant testified that some medical residents make up to $80,000 a
year and that such jobs are available." Mrs. Watson did not testify with any certainty that
in fact medical residents make up to $80,000 a year nor that Dr. Watson could find
employment as a resident and earn up to $80,000 a year. Mrs. Watson testified that she
"thought" that a resident's salary would be about $80,000 per year. Dr. Watson testified
that resident's salaries were not in that range and that if he could secure employment in
his field of specialty, anesthesiology, that he would in all likelihood only be able to earn
up to $50,000 in his first year.1 As a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by
the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on
this issue.
2.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 8. Income of Parties,

subparagraph (a): 'The Court finds that plaintiffs income will be imputed to him in the

1

In fact, first year residents at the University of Utah Medical Center are paid $31,125, seventh-year teaching
fellows are paid $38,700, and there is no anticipated vacancy at any time in the near future.
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sum of $80,000, an amount which he could earn as a resident in retraining, should he
choose to do so, or as an anesthesiologist, if he were willing to accept employment in a
situation similar to the Reno, Nevada opportunity." Dr. Watson testified that he is more
than willing to accept employment as an anesthesiologist but no work is currently
available. If the Court's intent was to impute the income of a resident to Dr. Watson,
then the imputed income should be in the range of $31,125 to $38,700, the actual income
range for residents at the nearest teaching facility. As a matter of law, this Finding of
Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding
and order a new trial on this issue.
3.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact Paragraph 5, Separate Property

Brought to the Marriage, subparagraph (c): "At the time of the marriage between the
parties, defendant had separate property which included a home, a vehicle and household
furniture. Defendant rented the home when she married plaintiff and used the rental
payments to pay the existing mortgage until the home was sold on or about November 20,
1991. Defendant received $32,470.26 as her equity from the sale of her home. The Court
finds that the proceeds from the sale of this home were given to plaintiff to invest and
that defendant is entitled to reimbursement for this amount." Mrs. Watson acknowledged
that all of the funds she received upon the sale of this property were placed in her
separate bank account. Mrs. Watson testified that Dr. Watson invested these funds, but
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that she had no knowledge of what the funds were invested in. Dr. Watson testified that
$20,000 of these funds was used to purchase two horses, with the approval of Mrs.
Watson. Mrs. Watson was awarded all of the horses purchased or born during the course
of the marriage and the proceeds from the sales thereof. Therefore, requiring a
reimbursement from Dr. Watson to Mrs. Watson of these funds, which were used to fund
the purchase of horses for which Mrs. Watson ultimately received the full benefit, results
in a double recovery for Mrs. Watson. As a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is
unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding and
order a new trial on this issue.
4.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 7. Debts,

subparagraph (b): "With the selling of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and the
rental/ranch house, the Court finds that using the June 2, 1992 schedule, there remains a
total marital debt of $37,300. The Court finds that plaintiff should be responsible to pay
the entirety of this debt and any remaining marital debt." Dr. Watson was forced to incur
additional debt just to service the debt on the real property. The monthly payments on
the real property plus taxes and insurance amounted to nearly $8,000 per month and Dr.
Watson was unemployed from March 1994 to the present. The only equitable distribution
and disposition on this issue would have been to have the debt incurred to service the
existing debt retired from the proceeds of the sale of the real property. As a matter of

-5-

law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore
vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
A.

Subparagraph (c): "Plaintiff was ordered in the June 2, 1992 Order (signed

June 8, 1992) at paragraph 5 not to take any action to further encumber the assets of the
parties. The parties agreed on October 29, 1993 (Order signed November 16, 1993) that
the June 2, 1992 Order would remain in effect. The Court finds that any further debts
incurred by the plaintiff in violation of the June 2 and October 29 Orders are the separate
debts of plaintiff." Dr. Watson erred in entering into more debt if the Court's intention,
given his unemployment, was to direct that the assets be allowed to go to foreclosure.
This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a
matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should
therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
B.

Subparagraph (d): "The home purchased by defendant after the separation

of the parties is for separate debt." The Court did not address the source of funding or
from whence the funds came for the $47,000 down payment which Mrs. Watson made on
the home she purchased. It is obvious that the down payment had to come from marital
assets since Mrs. Watson was not working outside of the home during the marriage and
she had not yet become employed. The entire $47,000 downpayment was thus a marital
asset and should have been divided between Dr. and Mrs. Watson. This Finding results
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in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this
Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate
this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
5.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 11, Support

Arrearage: "By the Orders of June 2, 1992 and November 16, 1993, plaintiff was to pay
temporary child support and alimony to defendant in the amount of $1,300 per month per
child for child support and $800 per month for alimony. From March 1994 until the time
of trial, defendant received her support payments from a trust holding insurance proceeds
from death of a horse owned by the parties. The Court finds that the judgment should be
entered against plaintiff for past due child support and alimony in the amount of $54,400,
subject to an equitable offset for that amount paid by plaintiffs interest into the trust
account." The evidence supports the fact that Dr. Watson was unemployed during the
entire period. Dr. Watson testified that he made his child support payments for March
and paid $600 in April of 1994. Dr. Watson's testimony at trial supports the facts of
these payments. Mrs. Watson became employed in August of 1994. This Finding does
not address the equitability of requiring Dr. Watson to pay alimony while unemployed
when Mrs. Watson was fully employed and when Mrs. Watson was receiving more than
$1,000 a month rent on the ranch property while Dr. Watson was left to pay the
mortgage. In this the Court erred as a matter of law. It would be most equitable to
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offset monies received by Mrs. Watson from rent from the ranch house against any
monies Dr. Watson would owe for back alimony and child support. This Finding results
in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this
Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate
this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
6,

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 12. Retirement Plans,

subparagraph (c): "The Court finds that the total amount of contributions made during
the marriage was $119,922.17 to which defendant is entitled to a credit for one-half of
that amount. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable that Defendant not be entitled
to any appreciation or responsible for any loss on the account itself." As a matter of law
the Court erred when it failed to consider appreciation and depreciation of the account.
As a matter of law the Court should have considered both appreciation and depreciation
and attributed those factors to the amount it awarded to both Dr. Watson and Mrs.
Watson. As a result, this Court should order a new trial on this issue.
?•

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 17. Personal

Property, subparagraph (a): "The Court finds that the personal property of the parties
shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree upon this division
within thirty days of entry of a final order. The personal property will include the Snyder
Oil stock, the $60,000 interest which plaintiff purchased in the Holiday Express, the
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interest in the St. George condo and the Honokaa vacation plan in Hawaii." Dr.
Watson's personal interest in the Holiday Express was $40,000. The $40,000 came from
the Loafer Canyon home equity line loan. This Court has determined that there is a
maximum of $40,000 marital interest in the home. Therefore, because this personal
investment came solely from the proceeds generated by a primarily pre-marital asset,
there should be no marital interest awarded to Mrs. Watson in this investment. In
addition, the pay-off of the St. George condo and the purchase of the other St. George
time-share condo also came from the home equity loan secured by the Loafer Canyon
home. This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets
and, as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this
Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
8*

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 18. Attorney's Fees

and Costs, subparagraph (a): "The Court finds that considering the difference in the
earning abilities of the parties and all other factors in the relative positions of the parties,
plaintiff should contribute $20,000 toward the payment of defendant's attorney's fees."
Dr. Watson has incurred attorney fees in excess of those charged to defendant to defend
himself in this action and against the charges of abuse leveled at him by Mrs. Watson.
Under the terms in this Memorandum Decision, Dr. Watson will have to file bankruptcy
because he will be left with an enormous debt and no way to pay it. This will result in
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Dr. Watson's inability to pay his own legal counsel while being required to pay for Mrs.
Watson's legal counsel. Under the terms of the Memorandum Decision as proposed,
Mrs. Watson may be awarded cash in excess of $210,000 and is in a better position to pay
her own legal fees; conversely, Dr. Watson will file bankruptcy and be unable to pay his
legal fees. This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets
and, as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this
Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
A.

Subparagraph (b): "Plaintiff should also pay one-half of the $1,120 owed to

Gilbert & Stewart for the audit prepared in the matter." Under the terms of the previous
court Order, Dr. Watson paid half of the bill for the court-appointed auditor. Mrs.
Watson simply refused to pay her half of the bill and now Dr. Watson is required to pay
half of a bill she was directed to pay by previous court order. This Finding results in an
inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this Finding
of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this
Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
9.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 20. Debt to Dr. Gale

Stringham: "A $7,912 debt exists for the therapy needs of the children and defendant.
The Court finds that plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of these fees, and
defendant will be held harmless therefrom with exception for the therapy costs incurred
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by defendant personally, which she shall be responsible for." This debt is the subject of
another court action and should be resolved in that litigation. This court did not have
before it the allegations of malpractice, etc. and further no exhibit regarding the debt
allegedly owed to Dr. Stringham was admitted by the Court. This Finding results in an
inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this Finding
of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this
Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
10.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, paragraph 22. Horse Business:

"By order of the Court on June 2, 1992, defendant was deemed responsible for the horse
business which was started by the parties during the marriage. Defendant sold the horses
and accounted for her business expenses, the net loss of the business was $3,097.58, which
loss defendant should bear. The Court finds that liquidation of the horse business was
proper." Mrs. Watson was ordered by this Court on more than one occasion to provide
an accounting for the horse business. Mrs. Watson was also required to provide
accounting documents to the auditor which she also failed to do. The accounting which
Mrs. Watson presented to the court did not adequately address the proceeds from the
sale of the horses, farm equipment, etc. or her expenses. Mrs. Watson made no attempt
to provide a separate listing of expenses related to the horse business, she simply provided
a list of all checks written from her account and in reaching the $3,097.58 deficit referred
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to in the Memorandum Decision she listed as expenses: entertainment, RC Willey, spa
dues, restaurants, clothing, gifts, expenses related to this action, etc.
Mrs. Watson's "accounting" fails to account for the fact that more than $450,000
was run through her Bank of American Fork checking account from the time of
separation to the time of trial. During which time, Mrs. Watson received only $17,535.28
from her employment. We believe that a more complete accounting would result in a
finding that, in fact, Mrs. Watson did receive tens of thousands of dollars in excess of her
costs when she liquidated the horses and farm equipment.
This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and,
as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court
should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue.
11.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, paragraph 24. Equitable

Distribution and Offsets: "This is a proper case for an equal distribution of assets and
debts between the parties. Where one party has both a credit and a debt to the other,
those amounts may be offset against each other." Dr. Watson fully supports this
contention. However, under the terms of the Memorandum Decision he is left with
overwhelming and inequitable distribution and disposition of the marital debt, and his
accounts receivable, which the Court awarded to him, have been completely depleted in
order to service the debt during the pendency of this proceeding while Mrs. Watson was
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awarded cash in excess of $210,000. This Finding results in an inequitable distribution
and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported
by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial
on this issue.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Watson respectfully requests that this Court grant his
motion for reconsideration or for a new trial on the issues raised herein and as set forth
above.

AO3
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [ J J

day of June, 1995.

KIRTON & McCONKIE

Samuel D. McVey
Daniel V. Goodsell
Thomas D. Walk
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify thai a trae and coned copy of the attached and. foregoing
MEMORANDUM OF POINT AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A NEW TRIAL was mailed this (ifr^
day of June, 1995, by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
C. Robert Collins
Attorney at Law
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19
P.O. Box 54516
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 924400816
DATE: July 6, 1995

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
SUZANNE WATSON,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court upon a notice to submit for consideration of
Plaintiffs Objection to the Proposed Supplement[sic] Decree of Divorce submitted in this case,
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration or For a New Trial and Defendant's Motion for
Attorney's Fees. Having received and considered Plaintiffs objection and motion, along with
Defendant's motion, together with memoranda both in support and in opposition to the
objection and motions, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs motion as well as Defendant's
motion and overrules the objection, this day signing the Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree of Divorce submitted in this matter.
Dated this 6th day of July, 1995.
BY^tf^COURl^

HORDING, JUD
cc:

C. Robert Collins, Esq.
Samuel D. McVey, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
DAVID WARREN WATSON,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 924400816

vs.
SUZANNE WATSON,

Judge Ray M. Harding
Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the Court for
trial on April 11 and 12, 1995, regarding the issues of child
support, alimony, division of property and division of debts, the
Court having reviewed and considered the evidence and testimony
admitted at trial, having heard from counsel, having reviewed the
exhibits admitted and deeming itself fully advised, makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

JURISDICTION & VENUE: Plaintiff was a bona fide resident

of the State of Utah and Utah County for more than three (3) months
prior to the filing

of this action.

The Court

finds that

1KDC

jurisdiction and venue are proper in the above entitled court.
2.

MARRIAGE

&

DIVORCE:

The parties

were married

on

September 2, 1988 and divorced by bifurcated decree on January 4,
1995.
3. . CUSTODY AND VISITATION:
visitation

of

the

parties'

minor

The issues of custody and
child

McCADE

WATSON

and

Plaintiff's minor child LlNDSEY WATSON have been resolved by
separate order of the Fourth District Juvenile Court. That courts
findings were not at issue at the trial on April 11 and 12, 1995
and will not be addressed in these findings.
4.

EMPLOYMENT:

a.

Plaintiff is a medical doctor and Defendant is a nurse

practitioner. Plaintiff

testified that he has been gainfully

employed as a doctor since his graduation from medical school
some 17 years prior to trial, but that he lost his employment on
March 22, 1994 and has been unable to locate employment since that
time.
b.

Plaintiff testified that he did not want to practice in

another field of medicine other than that which he had been
practicing. Plaintiff testified that he could obtain other medical
jobs, but that he would need some retraining. Plaintiff has made no
effort to retrain.

Plaintiff testified that he had made inquiry

into various anesthesiology positions and that he may be able to
work at a hospital in Reno, Nevada, where he would make about
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$50,000 to $75,000 the first year, about $100,000 the second year
and about $250,000 the third year.
c.

Defendant testified that some medical residents make up

to $80,000 a year and that such jobs are available.
d.

Defendant testified that she is a nurse practitioner,

but that during the marriage of the parties she remained at home
and cared for her child from a prior marriage, the parties child
and Plaintiff's children from his prior marriage. From the date of
the parties last separation until August

1994, Defendant was

involved in taking care of the ranch/farm business of the parties,
caring for the children and obtaining continuing medical education
so that she could re-enter the job market. In August, 1994,
Defendant went to work as a nurse practitioner making $45,500 a
year.
5.

SEPARATE PROPERTY BROUGHT TO THE MARRIAGE:

a.

The parties both had prior marriages and brought separate

property into this marriage.
b.

At the time of the marriage of the parties, Plaintiff had

an interest

in a retirement plan, interest

in a time share

condominium, a home on Loafer Canyon Road, Salem, Utah and some
household furnishing. During the marriage Plaintiff commingled the
assets of the retirement fund, revised the retirement fund, made
Defendant a trustee of the fund and made substantial contributions
to the plan from marital assets. The Loafer Canyon home was
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improved by the addition of a large metal building constructed with
marital assets, completion of the basement done with marital
assets, the purchase of a strip of land with marital assets to
legalize the zoning, and redecorating of the existing home with
marital ^assets.
c.

At the time of the marriage of the parties, Defendant had

separate property which included a home, a vehicle and household
furniture.

Defendant rented the home when she married Plaintiff

and used the rental payments to pay the existing mortgage until the
home sold which was on or about November

20 1991. Defendant

received $32,470.26 as her eguity from the sale of her premarital
home. The Court finds that the proceeds from the sale of this home
were given to Plaintiff to invest and the Defendant is entitled to
reimbursement of this amount.
6.

REAL PROPERTY:

a.

The parties purchase several pieces of real property

during the marriage. These purchases include 32 acres of land in
Lake Shore, a barn and a ranch/rental home.

The parties also

purchase a narrow strip of land next to the Loafer Canyon home in
order to meet zoning requirements.
b.

The 32 acres of property was sold and the proceeds of

$63,000 from the sale were placed in an escrow account held by
Provo Abstract Company.
c.

A valid offer for purchase of the barn and ranch property
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had been obtained at the time of trial, but the sale had not yet
been closed. The listing agent testified that the present offer of
$360,000 was a valid offer and should be accepted. There are two
(2) debts remaining on the ranch of $95,000 and $123,000 which
leaves a marital equity of $106,000 after deducting 10% for closing
costs and realtor fees. The parties should equally divide this
equity.
d.

There is also a marital interest in the Loafer Canyon

home due to the improvements, additions and land purchased to
correct the zoning. Plaintiff testified that the narrow strip of
land was purchased for $10,000 and the mental building, inclusive
of labor, cost $32,000. There was no testimony as to the value of
finishing the basement or the remodeling. The court finds that the
marital interest in the Loafer Canyon home is $40,000.
7.

DEBTS:

Plaintiff claims that a substantial debt of

approximately $800,000 still exist. At the time this action was
filed, Plaintiff filed a complete detailed list of all debts owned
as of June 2, 1992 in the amount of $632,100.
a.

On August 9, 1993, just prior to the second separation of

the parties, Plaintiff filed a credit application in which he
listed all debts at $588,400. The court finds that this statement
properly represented the existing debts as of August 9, 1993.
b.

With the selling of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and

the rental/ranch house, the court finds that using the June 2,
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1992, schedule there remains a total marital debt of $37,300. The
Court finds that Plaintiff

should be responsible to pay the

entirety of this debt and any remaining marital debts.
c.

Plaintiff was ordered in the June 2, 1992, order (order

signed June 8, 1992) not to take any action to further encumber the
assets of the parties. The parties agreed on October 29, 1993
(order signed November 16, 1993), that the June 2, 1992 order would
remain in effect.

The court finds that any further debt incurred

by Plaintiff in violation of the June 2, 1992 and the October 29,
1993 orders are the separate debts of Plaintiff.
d.

The home purchased by Defendant after the separations of

the parties is her property and her separate debt.
8.

INCOME OF THE PARTIES;

a.

The court finds that the Plaintiff's income will be

imputed to him in the sum of $80,000, a amount which he could earn
as a resident in retraining should he chose he to do so or as an
anesthesiologist, if he were willing to accept employment in a
situation similar to the Reno, Nevada, opportunity. At such time as
Plaintiff's earnings increase, the Court would consider a petition
to

modify

child

support

based

on

a

material

change

in

circumstances.
b.

Based on Defendant's admission that she is employed as a

nurse practitioner, the Court finds that Defendant earns a salary
of $45,500 a year.
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9.

ALIMONY:

Based on the respective needs of the parties,

the marital debt of the parties and both parties' ability to be
employed, the Court finds that an award of alimony to either party
would not be equitable or necessary.
10^

CHILD SUPPORT: Plaintiff should be required to pay child

support base upon the current Child Support Guidelines until the
children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high school
whichever is later.

Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare the

appropriate child support work sheet for submission to the court.
11.

SUPPORT ARREARAGE:

By the orders of June 2, 1992 and

November 16, 1993, Plaintiff was ordered to pay to Defendant
temporary child support and alimony in the amount of $1300 per
month per child for child support and $800 a month for alimony.
From March 1994, until the time of trial, Defendant received her
support payments from a trust account holding the proceeds from an
insurance company for the death of a horse owned by the parties.
The Court finds that judgment should be entered against Plaintiff
and in favor of Defendant for past due child support and alimony in
the amount of $54,400.00, subject to an equitable off set for the
amount paid by Plaintiff's interest in the trust account which was
$13,534.67, for a net judgment of $40,865.33.
12.

RETIREMENT PLANS:

a.

Plaintiff had a retirement fund at the time of the

marriage to which he made contributions during the marriage from

marital income.
b.

The Court

finds that during the parties' marriage,

Plaintiff made periodic contributions to the pension plan in the
following amounts:
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
c.

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

9,016.01 (deposited last quarter 1988)
13,552.42
43,518.80
23,702.27
23,082.68
7,050.00
none

The Court finds that the total contributions made during

the marriage was $119,922.17 to which Defendant is entitled to a
credit for one-half the amount or $59,961.09. The Court finds that
it is fair and equitable that Defendant not be entitled to any
appreciation or responsible for any loss on the account itself.
13.

ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE:

At the time of the marriage,

Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 in accounts receivable. At the
time of the separation of the parties and the termination of
Plaintiff's employment, Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 in
accounts receivable. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to
retain $200,000 of the accounts receivable as separate property,
therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to retain all of the account's
receivable.
14.

BANK ACCOUNTS:

The Court finds that any money held in

bank accounts belonging to the parties or to Plaintiff prior to the
separation should have been used to pay debts. As Plaintiff is to
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assume all debts, he is entitled to any money yet remaining in his
bank accounts.
15.

FUNDS HELD IN TRUST:

a.

The court finds that $50,000 from the insurance proceeds

paid on the death of a horse was placed in the trust account of
Defendant's attorney-

Each attorney received $10,000 of this and

the balance was paid to Defendant for alimony and child support.
The Court finds that each party has a one-half share in the trust
account. ($50,000 minus attorneys fees paid).
b.

There were

also

funds held

in a trust

account by

Plaintiff's attorneys representing the 1992 income tax refund of
the parties in the sum of $20,234 which should be divided equally
between the parties.
16.

FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW:

The parties sold 32 acres of

property during the pendency of this action and the proceeds are
currently in the trust account of Provo Abstract. From these funds,
each attorney has been paid $5,000. The Court finds that the
balance of these funds should be equally divided between the
parties.
17.

PERSONAL PROPERTY:

a.

The Court finds that the personal property of the parties

shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall
agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a final order.
The personal property will include the Snyder Oil Stock, the
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$60,000 interest which Plaintiff purchased in the Holiday Express,
the interest in the St George Condo, and the HONO KAA Vacation Plan
in Hawaii.
b.

Should the parties be unable to agree, Plaintiff shall

make two (2) lists for division of the personal property from which
Defendant shall select her choice of list between of the two (2)
lists. The property on that list shall be awarded to her and the
property on the other list awarded to Plaintiff.

Should Defendant

decline to select either list, all personal property shall be sold
and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties.
18.

ATTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS;

a.

The Court finds that considering the difference in the

earning abilities of the parties and all other factors in the
relative position of the parties, Plaintiff should contribute
$20,000 toward the payment of Defendant's attorneys fees.
b.

Plaintiff should also pay one-half of the $1120.00 owed

to Gilbert and Stewart for the audit prepared in the matter.
19.

MEDICAL & DENTAL NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN: Defendant should

maintain medical

and

dental

insurance

on the parties' minor

children in her custody so long as available to her through her
employment at a reasonable cost.

Pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-

7.15, if health insurance is a available to both parents at a
reasonable cost and the children would gain more complete coverage,
then both parents should be required to maintain insurance for the

ic.

children. Plaintiff shall name his minor children as beneficiaries
on any life insurance policies that he now has or obtains in the
future.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be responsible for

payment of one half of all uninsured medical and dental needs of
the children.
20.

DEBT TO DOCTOR GALE STRINGHAM: A debt of $7912.00 exist

for the therapy needs of the children and Defendant. The Court
finds that the Plaintiff shall be responsible for the payment of
these fees and Defendant should be held harmless therefrom with the
exception for the therapy costs incurred by Defendant personally,
she shall be responsible to pay.
21.

TAX EXEMPTIONS: Plaintiff is entitled to take LINDSEY as

a tax exemption if he is current in the payment of his child
support for the tax year involved.

Defendant is entitled to take

McCADE as a tax exemption.
22.

HORSE BUSINESS:

By order of the Court on June 2, 1992,

Defendant was deemed responsible for the horse business that was
started by the parties during their marriage. Defendant sold the
horse and accounted for the business expenses, the net loss of the
business was $3,097.58 which loss Defendant should bear. The Court
finds that liquidation of the horse business was proper.
23.

WATSON KENDAL INVESTMENT:

a.

Plaintiff had established a family partnership prior to

the marriage which gained income by handling the billing for his
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professional corporation. The partnership hired the services of a
collection company and retained part of the funds paid to it for
the billing as income to the partnership.
b.

Plaintiff has a 4% interest in the partnership which is

made uprof Plaintiff's four (4) children from a prior marriage,
each of whom has a 24% interest.
c.

The Court finds that the payments to the partnership were

for billing service rendered by the partnership and that the
children's

interest

in the partnership

funds

should

not be

disturbed. However, the court finds that it would be just and
equitable for Defendant to share in Plaintiff's interest in the
partnership funds contributed during the marriage. During the
marriage a total of $143,622 was paid to the partnership by
Plaintiff's

professional

corporation

in which

Plaintiff's

4%

interest would be $5,744.88 to which Defendant is entitled to one
half or $2,872.44.
d.

The art work belonging to the partnership and which is

now in Defendant's possession, shall be retained by Defendant in
trust for LINDSEY WATSON who has a 24% interest in the partnership
and who is in Defendant's custody as well as for the other
beneficiaries of the partnership.
24.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION & OFF SETS: This is a proper case

for an equal distribution of assets and debts between the parties.
Where one party has both credits and debts to the other, those

amounts may be off set against each other.
25.

CONTEMPT:

Under the circumstance, the Court finds that

it is not in the best interest of justice or of the marital estate
to make

a finding

of

contempt

and

impose penalties

on the

respective parties at this time. However, the Court may reserve any
findings of contempt should there me any violations of the final
order of this court. In this regard, the Court finds that although
technical violations of court orders have occurs in this case, such
violations have been relatively minor without substantial injury to
the marital estate.
26.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The above findings shall be effective as

of the date of trial in this matter rather than the date of
separation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The court should confirm the prior decree of divorce.

B.

The court should confirm the prior order of the Fourth

District Juvenile Court as to custody and visitation.
C.

The division of property and allocation of debts in this

case is fair and equitable.
D.

Child support should be as herein set forth.

E.

Neither party should receive alimony from the other.

F.

Plaintiff should contribute attorneys fees as herein set

forth.
G.

All other matters should be as herein ordered.

Dated and signed this

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 31st day of May,
1995, to Plaintiff's Attorney at:
SAMUEL D. McVEY
DANIEL GOODSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111

yy/^
C. ROBERT COLLINS
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
DAVID WARREN WATSON,

SUPPLEMENT*DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 924400816

vs.

SUZANNE WATSON,
Judge Ray M. Harding
Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the Court for
trial on April 11 and 12, 1995, regarding the issues of child
support, alimony, division of property and division of debts, the
Court having reviewed and considered the evidence and testimony
admitted at trial, having heard from counsel, having reviewed the
exhibits admitted, having made its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and deeming itself fully advised,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that order of the Fourth
District Juvenile Court related to custody and visitation shall be
and is hereby confirmed and is this court's prior Decree of
Divorce.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $32,470.26 which represent the eguity from
the sale of her premarital home which money was given to Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $20,000.00 which represent her share of the
marital equity in the Loafer Canyon home.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay the marital
debts of the parties and shall hold Defendant harmless therefrom.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay any debt he has
individually incurred since June 2, 1992 and shall hold Defendant
harmless from same unless otherwise set forth herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall pay any debt she
has individually

incurred

since June 2, 1992 and shall hold

Plaintiff harmless from same unless otherwise set forth herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither party shall pay alimony to
the other party.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay child support
to Defendant for the two (2) minor children in her custody in the
sura of $482.24 per month per child for a total of $964.48 a month
commencing May

1, 1995, and each month thereafter until the

children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high school
whichever is later.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $40,865.33 which represent past due child

support and alimony under the temporary orders of the court.
($54,400.00 less Plaintiff's interest in the trust account which
was $13,534.67, for a net judgment of $40,865.33.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $59,961.09 which represent one half of the
marital interest of $119,922.17 in Plaintiff's retirement plan.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $30,000.00 which represent one half of the
marital investment made by Plaintiff in the Holiday Express Motel
in Spanish Fork, Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall be entitled to the
accounts receivable in his professional corporation and the bank
accounts in his name or that of his professional corporation as his
sole and separate property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be entitled to the
bank accounts in her name or under her control as her sole and
separate property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall equally divide
$20,234.00 held in a trust account by Plaintiff's attorneys for the
1992 income tax refund of the parties.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall receive one half
of the funds now being held in the trust account of Provo Abstract
in the approximate amount of $63,000 or $31,500 each.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall equally divide

the marital equity of $106,000 or approximately $53,000 each after
deducting 10% for closing cost and realtor fees from the sale of
the farm/ranch property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the personal property of the
parties shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties
shall agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a final
order. The personal property will include the Snyder Oil Stock, the
interest in the St George Condo, and the HONO KAA Vacation Plan in
Hawaii.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should the parties be unable to
agree on the distribution of the personal property, Plaintiff shall
make two (2) lists for division of the personal property from which
Defendant shall select her choice of lists between of the two (2)
lists. The property list selected by Defendant shall be awarded to
her and the property on the other list shall awarded to Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should Defendant decline to select
either personal property list, all personal property shall be sold
and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $20,000.00 which represent attorneys fees
awarded to Defendant herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall maintain medical
and dental insurance on the parties' minor children in her custody
so long as available to her through her employment at a reasonable

cost. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-7.15, if health insurance is a
available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the children
would gain more complete coverage, then both parents shall be
required to maintain insurance for the children.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall name his minor
children as beneficiaries on any life insurance policies that he
now has or obtains in the future.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and Defendant shall each
be responsible for payment of one half of all uninsured medical and
dental needs of the children.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay to Dr. Gale
Stringham the sum of $5040.00 for the therapy needs of the children
and shall hold Defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant shall be
responsible for any therapy costs personally incurred to Dr. Gale
Stringham.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall be entitled to take
LINDSEY WATSON as a tax exemption if he is current in the payment
of his child support at the end of the tax year involved and
Defendant shall be entitled to take McCADE as a tax exemption.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's accounting of the horse
business is approved by the Court. Defendant shall bear the loss of
the business of $3,097.58.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment
against Plaintiff for $2,872.44 which represents one half of the

marital interest in WATSON KENDAL INVESTMENT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the art work belonging to WATSON
KENDAL INVESTMENT which is now in Defendant's possession, shall be
retained by Defendant in trust for LINDSEY WATSON who has a 24%
interest in the partnership and who is in Defendant's custody as
well as for the other beneficiaries of the trust.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to find either
party

in

contempt

of

court,

however,

the

Court

reserves

jurisdiction to find contempt should there be any violations of
this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the effective date of this decree
shall be the date of the trial in this matter rather than the date
of separation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall receive no payments
under this supplement decree until all
Plaintiff herein are fully paid.
Dated and signed this

judgments

awarded to

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 31st day of May,
1995, to Plaintiff's Attorney at:
SAMUEL D. MCVEY
DANIEL GOODSELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111

C. ROBERT COLLINS

